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THE ROLE OF THE PROFIT 
IMPERATIVE IN RISK MANAGEMENT 
Christopher C. French* 
Risks in the world abound.  Every day there is a chance that each of us 
could be in a car accident.  Or, one of us could be the victim of a tornado, 
flood or earthquake.  Every day someone becomes deathly ill from an 
insidious disease.  Our properties are in constant peril—one’s house could 
catch fire at any time or a tree could fall on it during a storm.  Any one of 
these events could have devastating financial consequences, and they are 
just a few of the many risks that impact our daily lives.  One of the 
principal ways we manage risk is by purchasing insurance.  In the absence 
of insurance, many losses would cause financial ruin.  Thus, for some lines 
of insurance such as health and homeowners, insurance serves a critical 
function in America as a social safety net. 
This Article explores the role the profit imperative has and should 
have in risk management today.  As publicly traded stock companies, 
which are driven by the profit imperative, have come to dominate the 
insurance industry in the past two decades, inherent conflicts between the 
purpose of insurance and the goal of insurers have developed.  These 
conflicts are manifested by insurers’ refusal to insure certain people and 
businesses and the hollowing out of the coverage provided by insurance 
policies through the addition of exclusions for risks of loss that insurers 
have concluded do not provide adequate profit margins.  The profit 
imperative also has forced insurers and their policyholders to become 
adversaries with respect to the valuation and payment of claims because 
every dollar paid for a policyholder’s loss is a dollar that cannot be paid to 
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the insurer’s shareholders. 
After discussing the history of these conflicts, the Article then 
explores various ways to resolve them.  Some of the resolutions are:  the 
elimination of some exclusions in policies, the creation of restrictions on 
insurers’ ability to refuse to insure certain people and businesses, and the 
imposition of penalties when insurers fail to pay claims timely and in full.  
For socially critical lines of insurance, if any voids in insurance markets 
were to develop due to the current laws being changed in the ways 
discussed in the Article, then state sponsored insurance programs could be 
created to fill the voids. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world is a very dangerous place.  Every day there is a chance that 
each of us could be in a car accident.  Or, we could be the victims of a 
natural catastrophe such as a tornado, flood or earthquake.  Every day 
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someone is diagnosed with a deadly disease.  Our properties are in constant 
peril—houses catch fire every day and trees regularly fall on houses during 
storms.  Any one of these events could have devastating financial 
consequences, and they are just a few of the many risks that surround our 
daily lives.  There a number of ways we attempt to reduce these risks.  For 
example, we fasten our seat belts and maintain our vehicles in an attempt to 
avoid accidents and minimize the consequences of accidents.  We cut down 
trees next to our houses and install smoke alarms in an attempt to prevent 
damage to our homes and the people in them.  In addition to loss 
prevention measures, however, one of the principal ways we manage risk is 
by purchasing insurance.  This Article focuses upon our attempts to transfer 
the risk of loss to insurers and explores the role that the profit imperative 
plays with respect to insurers’ behavior. 
The central thesis of this Article is that the profit imperative is in 
conflict with the objective of insurance.  The purpose of insurance is to 
transfer the risk of loss from entities that do not want, or cannot afford, to 
absorb the financial losses that arise from natural and unnatural events to 
well-capitalized insurers that are able to spread the risk of loss across large 
pools of policyholders.  In the absence of insurance, we face the risk of 
financial ruin with each passing car or storm.  On the other hand, the 
providers of the vast majority of insurance today are publicly traded stock 
companies whose corporate mandate is to maximize profits for the benefit 
of their shareholders.  In the absence of legal or regulatory intervention, the 
profit imperative dictates that insurers accept the transfer of risk only with 
respect to entities and perils that they can consistently insure at high profit 
margins, leaving those in most need of insurance without it.  This 
irreconcilable conflict between the purpose of insurance and the profit 
imperative is the primary source of discord in insurance law today.  This 
conflict did not always exist and it does not have to continue to exist 
unmitigated. 
As originally conceived and implemented in America in the mid-
1700s, insurance functioned as a social safety net through which a 
community or group as a whole acted for the benefit of the unlucky few 
who suffered losses.  People and businesses each contributed a premium to 
a “mutual” company or group to create a pool of money from which losses 
were paid.  Essentially, the insurance company acted as a third-party 
administrator that collected the premiums to create the pool of money from 
which losses would be paid and then paid such losses as they arose.  
Initially, these mutual insurance companies only covered fire losses.  Over 
time, however, insurance expanded to cover the other myriad risks of loss 
that exist. 
The need for insurance is even greater today than it was in the 1700s.  
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Imagine being a homeowner in Oklahoma when tornadoes rip through the 
state each spring or on the coast in the Gulf of Mexico, Florida or the East 
Coast when a hurricane makes landfall.  Or, imagine being diagnosed with 
cancer.  Now imagine that the afflicted homeowner or person does not have 
property insurance or health insurance.  What happens to such people?  
Financial ruin unless they are the beneficiaries of the generosity of 
strangers or a government bailout. 
Not only does insurance provide peace of mind and ensure one’s 
financial security in the event of a catastrophe in ways that hoping for a 
government bailout or the generosity of strangers do not, but insurance 
actually has become a necessity to live and function in America today.  It is 
required, for example, in order to legally drive a car to work or to obtain a 
mortgage for a home.  In short, in most parts of this country a person 
cannot hold a job or be a homeowner today without insurance. 
Yet, as the need for insurance has increased, insurers’ willingness to 
cover certain people and risks has decreased.  Although the profit 
imperative began forcing insurers to begin refusing to insure some perils, 
such as floods, in the 1950s and 1960s, insurers’ efforts to avoid insuring 
certain people and certain risks have accelerated since the 1970s.  The 
reason is simple:  profits.  The idea of insurance as a social safety net, in 
which a group of people or businesses as a whole acts for the benefit of the 
unfortunate few, was lost when the corporate structure of insurance 
companies shifted from mutual companies to for-profit, publicly traded 
stock companies.  Although this shift had been occurring for some time, it 
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s to the point that the vast majority of 
insurance companies today are for-profit, publicly traded stock companies. 
As profit-maximizing enterprises, publicly traded stock companies’ 
overriding mandate is to make as much money as possible for their 
shareholders.  Policyholders who pay premiums are merely revenue 
streams for publicly traded stock companies.  And the payments of 
policyholders’ losses are expenses that reduce insurers’ profits.  Thus, the 
profit imperative dictates that insurers relentlessly seek to increase 
revenues while decreasing expenses for the benefit of their shareholders. 
Insurers have sought to fulfill this mandate on both the front end and 
the back end of the business of insurance.  On the front end—the 
underwriting stage—insurers quickly have moved to eliminate coverage 
from their policies for risks that do not have satisfactory profit margins as 
soon as such risks have been identified.  Insurers also have used the claims 
data they have collected and analyzed over the course of many decades to 
identify the people who are most likely to have losses (i.e., the “bad” risks) 
and then refuse to insure those people. 
On the back end—paying claims—insurers have become professional 
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litigators in order to avoid or at least minimize the amounts they have to 
pay for their policyholders’ losses.  In the words of one insurer, an insurer 
today is “a professional defender of lawsuits.”1  Or, as described by one 
federal judge, insurers are like “major league team[s]” in the game of 
“hardball litigation.”2  Indeed, when it comes to the payment of 
policyholders’ losses, insurers and policyholders are adversaries.  The 
profit imperative dictates that insurers minimize the amounts they pay for 
their policyholders’ losses in order to maximize their shareholders’ profits. 
Although much of this Article is dedicated to developing the claim 
that the profit imperative that drives insurers today is inconsistent with the 
purpose of insurance and is the primary source of conflict in contemporary 
insurance law, the Article proposes some normative solutions to the 
complex problem of ensuring that insurance is available for all at 
affordable prices despite the profit imperative that currently drives insurers.  
For example, in the absence of a finding that an insurer acted in bad faith, 
which is very difficult to prove, insurers currently have no incentive to pay 
the full amount of a loss timely because their liability for failing to do so is 
limited to paying the unpaid amount they already owe plus interest.  
Consequently, under the current laws, the profit imperative demands that 
insurers attempt to pay less than the full value of losses and to make 
payments on losses as slowly as possible because there are no negative 
consequences for doing so.  Although the number of potential solutions to 
this problem is limited only by our imaginations and thus a truly fulsome 
discussion of the subject is beyond the scope of a single article, one idea is 
to create and impose penalties on any insurer that refuses to pay a loss 
timely or offers less than the full value even if the insurer’s conduct does 
not amount to bad faith.  For example, if a fact finder determines that the 
value of a claim is $1000, but the insurer only paid or offered to pay $700, 
then the insurer would be liable not just for the additional $300 plus 
interest, but also for the policyholder’s attorneys’ fees and a 20% penalty 
on the unpaid $300 (which, not coincidentally, is the same penalty amount 
the IRS imposes on taxpayers who underpay their taxes). 
To address the problem of insurers refusing to cover the most common 
types of catastrophic risks we face in this country such as hurricanes, 
tornadoes and floods under property policies, legislation could be passed 
 
 1.  John N. Ellison et al., Bad Faith and Punitive Damages: The Policyholder’s Guide 
to Bad Faith Insurance Coverage Litigation, in Environmental Insurance: Emerging Issues 
and Latest Developments on the New Coverage and Insurance Cost Recovery, Philadelphia: 
ALI-ABA 159 (2008) (quoting Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 7, filed July 5, 1988, National Union 
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. La. 1988)). 
 2.  Adolph Coors Co. v. American Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 507, 509 (D. Colo. 1993). 
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that prevents insurers from excluding coverage for such risks.  Also, for 
lines of insurance that are determined to be socially critical such as 
property, auto and health insurance,3 additional restrictions could be placed 
on insurers’ ability to refuse to insure applicants who are willing to pay for 
the insurance but currently are rejected by insurers because they are 
considered “bad” risks. 
Of course, we need to recognize that if certain exclusions in policies 
were eliminated and insurers’ ability to refuse to insure certain applicants 
were reduced, then insurers may refuse to sell the insurance.  There are at 
least three reasons for this:  (1) insurers believe that some risks such as 
catastrophes are highly correlated risks for which they cannot charge 
premiums high enough to satisfy their target profit margins; (2) insurers’ 
shareholders demand profitability on both long-term and short-term bases, 
which could not be ensured if insurers were required to insure catastrophic 
risks because the losses associated with such risks create periods of short-
term unprofitability; and (3) the profit margins on applicants who are “bad 
risks” are inadequate or negative. 
So, what would happen if insurers were to refuse to sell insurance in 
the normative legal regime being discussed?  State sponsored insurance 
programs could be created to fill any voids.  Unlike private insurers, state 
sponsored insurance programs are able to take a long-term view regarding 
the financial needs of insurance programs that cover catastrophic risks and 
“bad risk” policyholders because such programs do not have to generate 
short and long-term profits for shareholders. 
In many respects, state sponsored insurance programs are actually 
better vehicles to fulfill the purpose of insurance than private insurers for 
certain types of insurance.  For example, the tax and accounting laws 
currently create disincentives for insurers to insure catastrophic risks 
because they discourage insurers from accumulating and holding the capital 
needed to pay widespread catastrophic losses.  Further, publicly traded 
stock companies that accumulate large capital surpluses become takeover 
targets for corporate raiders.  State sponsored insurance programs, on the 
other hand, can accumulate capital for the purpose of paying catastrophic 
widespread losses tax-free and cannot be acquired by corporate raiders. 
The premiums charged by state sponsored insurance programs also 
should be lower than insurance sold by private insurers.  Insurers spend 
literally billions of dollars annually on advertising in order to compete for 
customers’ premium dollars.  Indeed, auto insurance commercials during 
prime time television are so pervasive that everyone knows the Geico 
 
 3.  As discussed in Part III.C.4, this idea currently is being implemented for health 
insurance under the Affordable Care Act. 
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Gecko and Progressive’s spokeswoman, Flo.  A sitcom based upon Geico’s 
cavemen commercials was actually created at one point because Geico’s 
commercials ran so frequently that the Geico cavemen became part of 
America’s pop culture.  Policyholders, of course, ultimately paid for all of 
those commercials that made the Geico cavemen a pop culture 
phenomenon through their premiums.  If private insurers were to decline to 
sell property insurance that covers catastrophic risks, then state sponsored 
insurance programs obviously would not need to spend money advertising 
because they would not be competing with dozens of other insurers for 
premium dollars.  Thus, the premiums they would charge should be lower. 
Insurers also spend significant amounts of money on underwriting and 
claims handling in their attempts to ferret out the “bad” risks to avoid 
insuring them and to fight to lower the amounts they must pay for their 
policyholders’ losses.  State sponsored insurance programs, on the other 
hand, would not need to spend significant amounts on underwriting and 
could spend less on claims handling because the profit imperative would 
not mandate that they fight to reduce the amounts paid on legitimate claims 
because their primary goal would not be the maximization of profits for the 
benefit of their shareholders.  Thus, the premiums they charge should be 
lower for these reasons as well. 
Further, under state sponsored insurance programs, policyholders and 
their insurers would not need to be adversaries during the claims 
adjustment process.  Although such programs would, of course, still need 
to verify the legitimacy of the claims submitted, state sponsored insurance 
programs would not have shareholders demanding quarterly dividend 
payments that are generated by paying as little as possible for 
policyholders’ losses and waiting as long as possible to make such 
payments regardless of the value or validity of the losses.  Thus, the claims 
payment process should be far less adversarial. 
In many respects, state sponsored insurance programs would be a 
natural evolution of states’ existing involvement in the insurance industry 
because states already heavily regulate the insurance industry by, among 
other things, establishing capital surplus requirements, approving premium 
rates and policy language, and running insurance guarantee programs to 
cover the claims of insolvent insurers. 
Although limited in scope and type, state sponsored insurance 
programs already are being used for some lines of insurance in certain parts 
of America.  California, for example, created an earthquake insurance 
program when insurers began refusing to cover earthquakes following the 
Northridge earthquake in 1994.  Similarly, the Gulf and southeastern 
coastal states have been forced in recent years to become the primary 
sources of insurance for property damage caused by hurricanes as insurers 
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have refused to sell insurance that covers such losses.  In addition, for 
many years, states have had auto insurance programs for drivers who 
insurers refuse to insure. 
Even better evidence, however, of the viability and desirability of state 
sponsored insurance programs can be found in Europe.  Several European 
countries have state sponsored insurance programs that are demonstrably 
cheaper than private insurance and, unlike insurers in America, are viewed 
quite favorably by their citizens when it comes to the payment of claims. 
This Article develops the claim that the principal conflict in risk 
management and insurance law today can be traced to the inconsistency 
between the purpose of insurance and the profit imperative that is driving 
private insurers in three parts.  Part One discusses the origins and purpose 
of insurance.  It begins with a discussion regarding risk transfer and the 
theory of the “law of large numbers” that underlie the concept of insurance.  
It then traces the evolution of insurance from contracts of “bottomry” 
created for maritime traders in Babylonia in 2250 B.C. to the creation of 
mutual companies in America to serve as a social safety net for fire losses 
in the 1700s to the rise of for-profit, publicly traded stock insurance 
companies that dominate the insurance market today.  Part One concludes 
with a discussion regarding the crucial role insurance plays in modern 
society. 
Part Two sets forth the bases for the claim that the profit imperative 
has driven insurers to refuse to cover any risks that threaten their profit 
margins.  As examples to develop the claim, insurers’ treatment of 
environmental claims and asbestos-related liabilities, as well as insurers’ 
creation of numerous exclusions under comprehensive general liability 
policies, are discussed.  Insurers’ refusal to insure certain risks of loss such 
as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes under property policies, as well as 
the insertion of numerous exclusions in such policies, is also discussed.  
Part Two concludes by discussing how the profit imperative has caused the 
claims payment process under both consumer and commercial lines of 
insurance to become adversarial as insurers have sought to minimize the 
amounts they pay for covered losses. 
Part Three discusses some ideas regarding normative solutions to the 
conflict between the profit imperative and the purpose of insurance in risk 
management that exists today, as well as the anticipated objections to such 
solutions.  The implementation of the ideas contemplated in this Article, 
with or without private insurers’ willing participation, should allow the 
purpose and role of insurance in risk management—the transfer of the risk 
of loss from those who cannot afford to bear the loss to those who can—to 
once again be fulfilled. 
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II. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF INSURANCE 
A. The Concept of Insurance 
The concept underlying insurance is quite simple.  A person or a 
business transfers the risk of loss to another entity in exchange for the 
payment of a premium.4  The principal reason most people and businesses 
purchase insurance is to avoid uncertain, but potential, future losses.5  The 
purchaser of insurance incurs a relatively small certain loss by paying a 
premium in order to avoid the risk of larger, uncertain future losses.6  
Although the law has sought to diminish insurance’s similarity to gambling 
by requiring, for example, that a person purchasing insurance actually have 
an “insurable interest” in the object being insured (i.e., a reason to want the 
person or item insured not to be injured or damaged),7 a person who 
purchases insurance is hedging against the risk of something terrible 
 
 4.  J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 
88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 342 (2006). 
 5.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 10 (5th ed. 2012) (observing how people become more risk averse as the 
potential magnitude of loss increases).  Corporations sometimes purchase insurance for 
reasons beyond risk aversion.  For example, there are tax advantages for corporations that 
purchase insurance.  Corporations can deduct premiums as business expenses.  See TOM 
BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY 
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 63 (2010) (explaining how the tax 
benefits of corporate insurance turn on the favorable treatment of market insurance over 
self-insurance).  On the other hand, a corporation that simply puts aside the funds that would 
be used to pay premiums into a reserve fund to pay claims would not be able to receive a 
deduction for those amounts and the company also would have to pay taxes on the income 
the reserves earned.  Id.  Insurance also protects against the risk of bankruptcy.  Id. at 63–64.  
In addition, many lenders require corporate borrowers to have insurance so corporations that 
do not have insurance incur higher borrowing costs.  Id. at 64.  Similarly, when a company 
is confronting a crisis that creates an uncertain future due to, for example, a catastrophe such 
as a flood, the company’s ability to raise capital is limited and insurance provides a ready 
source of funds to address such situations.  Id. at 65.  Some companies also purchase 
insurance for the loss-prevention expertise of insurers that the companies themselves lack.  
Id. at 66.  Finally, insurance protects the shareholders’ investments in the company by 
lowering the volatility of a company’s share price by smoothing the company’s profits and 
losses that otherwise would be impacted by the payments of settlements and judgments.  Id. 
at 67. 
 6.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5 (describing how many people would 
prefer to lose one dollar with certainty rather than take a one in ten thousand chance of 
losing ten thousand dollars); JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE 
COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 14 (2010) (describing 
the concept of insurance in operation as a person or entity willing to exchange a small, 
certain loss to avoid a larger, uncertain loss). 
 7.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 255–58 (exploring the origins and 
purpose of the insurable interest requirement). 
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happening.  As described by one court, a person who buys insurance is 
attempting to “buy financial protection and peace of mind against 
[un]fortuitous losses.”8 
The entity that accepts the risk of loss typically spreads the risk of loss 
across a large number of policyholders.9  Although it is expected that some 
people will suffer losses, only a subset of the total pool of people insured 
will actually incur losses.  This concept is known as the “law of large 
numbers.”10  In essence, the large percentage of fortunate people that pay 
for insurance but do not suffer a loss receive peace of mind through their 
purchase of insurance and their premiums subsidize the unfortunate few 
people who do suffer losses.11  In short, everyone pays a premium to create 
a pool of funds from which the unfortunate few that suffer losses will be 
paid.  Under this concept of insurance, if some people do not participate in 
the risk pool, whether by choice or exclusion, then the fulfillment of the 
purpose of insurance is reduced.12 
In a non-profit context, the insurer simply functions as an intermediary 
that facilitates this transfer of risk from the individual to the group.  For 
some lines of insurance, such as auto insurance, the insurance industry can 
predict with great accuracy the likelihood and extent of the actual risk of 
loss that is transferred because it has collected very detailed and accurate 
information regarding the likelihood and severity of injuries with respect to 
various risk classifications.  For example, insurers know that on average:  
(1) there will be 21 fatalities for every 1000 licensed drivers, (2) a driver 
aged 21 to 24 is almost three times as likely to be involved in a fatal crash 
while intoxicated as a driver 55 to 64 years old, and (3) the average 
collision repair cost for all cars is $3131.13  Knowing what each 
policyholder pays in premiums and the amount of the losses, the insurer is 
able to predict with great accuracy the expected return it will receive for 
accepting the transfer of risk. 
 
 8.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
98 P.3d 409, 415 (Utah 2004)). 
 9.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 14. 
 10.  Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012); Cummins, supra note 4. 
 11.  See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003) (explaining how insurance is predicated on 
the existence of a large number of fortunate members’ premiums paying for the losses of the 
unfortunate few); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral 
Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999) (noting how the basic premise of insurance is 
collective responsibility for harms that befall individuals). 
 12.  See Baker, supra note 11, at 378 (stating that the reduction of the ability of the 
insurance pool to spread risk has an adverse effect on the insurance pool). 
 13.  FEINMAN, supra note 6. 
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As discussed more fully below in Part II. C, for-profit, publicly traded 
stock companies, which are operating for the benefit of their shareholders 
rather than as third party intermediaries for the benefit of pools of 
policyholders, use claims data and risk classifications to charge different 
premium rates to the people in the various risk classifications or to refuse to 
insure certain people or risks they deem unprofitable or inadequately 
profitable. 
B. The Origins of Insurance and the Demise of Mutual Insurance 
Companies 
Insurance traces its roots back to Babylonian maritime traders as early 
as 2250 B.C.  The Babylonians developed what were known as contracts of 
“bottomry,” under which investors would loan money or goods to a 
merchant at a high interest rate with the understanding that the borrower’s 
obligation to pay the interest or the debt would be eliminated if the vessel 
carrying the goods sank or was pirated.14  The Phoenicians, Greeks, and 
Romans subsequently used contracts of bottomry.15  Centuries later, 
bottomry contracts evolved into what we know today as insurance contracts 
with Lloyd’s of London being the first formal insurer of vessels and cargo 
in the late seventeenth century.16  Following the Great Fire of London in 
1666, insurers also began selling insurance to cover fire losses for non-
marine properties.17 
In the United States, insurance initially developed as community 
projects for fire insurance in which members of a community contributed to 
a pool of money from which a member would be paid if his property were 
destroyed by a fire.18  The first one of these “mutual” companies was called 
the “Philadelphia Contributorship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire” 
and was established in Philadelphia in 1752, with Ben Franklin as one of its 
first directors.19  Similar mutual companies subsequently were formed 
throughout the country to protect people and businesses against fire 
losses.20  Thus, through the collective actions of communities and groups of 
businesses, mutual insurance pools were developed as social safety nets for 
 
 14.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 16 (finding the earliest traces of risk 
transference resembling insurance within ancient Babylonian society). 
 15.  Id. at 16–17. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 16–18. 
 18.  Id. at 18; see also FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 21 (noting how early insurance 
companies, including lumbermen insurance companies, were keenly aware of their 
responsibility to pay claims since they were initially formed to share losses). 
 19.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 21. 
 20.  Id. 
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individuals and businesses through which a community or group as a whole 
acted for the benefit of the unlucky few who suffered losses.21 
In mutual companies, the members who contribute to the pool of 
funds used to pay for losses own the company, and they are insured under 
the pool.22  In contrast, in a for-profit, publically traded stock company, 
shareholders contribute capital to the company, but they are not insured by 
it; their interest in the company is limited to maximizing the return on their 
investments.23  Thus, the collective interests of a mutual insurance 
company’s owners and policyholders are aligned, while a for-profit, 
publicly traded stock insurance company’s owners’ and policyholders’ 
interests are not.  Indeed, as will be discussed more fully in Part II.C, there 
is a significant conflict of interest between corporate shareholders and 
policyholders when it comes to paying policyholders’ claims. 
Mutual companies, however, are a dying corporate form for 
companies in most lines of insurance.  Although it was the dominant 
corporate form when insurance companies were first created hundreds of 
years ago for the purpose of allowing a community or group of businesses 
to pool their assets together to protect the unlucky few that suffered losses, 
competition for insurance premium dollars and capital largely has driven 
mutual companies out of the market for most lines of insurance.24  There 
was a dramatic shift from the mutual company form to for-profit, publicly 
traded stock companies in the 1990s.25  The primary justification given for 
the change is that stock companies can raise capital and diversify into other 
lines of insurance more easily than mutual companies.26  Mutual 
companies’ primary means of raising capital is by generating and retaining 
earnings, unlike stock companies, which can simply issue new shares.27  
Other justifications for the switch from the mutual form to stock form 
include the claim that stock companies can attract better employees and 
 
 21.  Id. at 22–23. 
 22.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 47–48 (noting that mutual 
companies are not designed for profit, but instead to provide insurance to the members of 
the company); James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance Companies: A 
Practical Guide Through The Process, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 516 (2001) (defining mutual 
insurance company). 
 23.  Smallenberger, supra note 22. 
 24.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 48. 
 25.  Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise of The Mutual 
Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING 1011, 1011 (2010). 
 26.  See, e.g., Smallenberger, supra note 22, at 518 (detailing competitive market 
advantages); Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus 
Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 138 (1985) (explaining corporate fundraising via bond 
issuance). 
 27.  Hansmann, supra note 26. 
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managers by offering stock options, as well as the changes to the federal 
income tax laws in the 1980s that resulted in the elimination of the 
favorable tax treatment that mutual insurance companies had been 
receiving.28 
C. Insurance’s Essential Role in Society 
Today, insurance’s role in society has become far larger than it was in 
the 1700s.  One insurance law scholar describes insurance as a “social 
instrument” because of its important and socially desirable role of 
protecting the limited assets of individuals and business owners against 
catastrophic losses by spreading and transferring the risk of such losses to 
well-capitalized insurers.29  Indeed, insurance has become integral to 
people’s lives and the conduct of business in developed countries such as 
America.30  Without insurance, people and businesses simply could not 
function in today’s world.  For example, anyone who wants to purchase a 
house using a bank to finance a mortgage is required to have homeowners 
insurance in an amount adequate to cover the mortgage.31  Anyone who 
wants to drive a car must have auto insurance.32  Almost all states require 
businesses to have workers’ compensation insurance.33  In many business 
 
 28.  Hansmann, supra note 26; Smallenberger, supra note 22, at 518. 
 29.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social 
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2010).  See also Erik S. Knutsen, Auto 
Insurance as Social Contract: Solving Automobile Insurance Coverage Disputes Through a 
Public Regulatory Framework, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 715, 716 (2011) (noting that because 
auto insurance is mandatory in order to ensure that victims are compensated and 
policyholders have no ability to change the policy language, the terms used in auto policies 
should not be interpreted strictly without regard to the social purpose underlying the 
policies); Stone, supra note 11, at 26–29 (“Because virtually every adult citizen participates 
in various forms of mandatory insurance, from automobile liability insurance to 
unemployment insurance, old-age pensions and disability insurance, everyone is exposed to 
two of the moral assumptions of these programs: collective responsibility for the well-being 
of individuals and individual responsibility for the well-being of others.”). 
 30.  Stempel, supra note 29, at 1497. 
 31.  Id.  See also MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER 
DEMAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 (2003) (stating that “homeowners insurance . . . is 
essentially mandatory” in discussing the demand for homeowners insurance). 
 32.  Stempel, supra note 29, at 1497–98.  See also MARK. S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION 
TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 222 (8th ed. 2005) (discussing the financial 
responsibility laws that require drivers to purchase insurance); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & 
THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 539–41 (8th ed. 1999) 
(conducting a 50-state survey of compulsory automobile liability insurance laws). 
 33.  Stempel, supra note 29, at 1498.  See also GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 556 (9th ed. 2005) (noting that “[a]ll states today have 
workers compensation laws”). 
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transactions, such as construction contracts, one party typically is required 
to maintain insurance to cover the project.34  In short, because insurance 
fills an important need in modern society, it has become a necessity in 
many respects. 
In addition, aside from mandatory insurance, if someone lives or does 
business in areas prone to disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, or floods, 
they need insurance to protect their homes and businesses.  Without it, they 
risk bankruptcy with each passing storm.  Of course, if the insurers from 
whom the policies are purchased do not pay the full value of the actual 
losses when they arise due to exclusions or aggressive claims payment 
practices, then the purpose of the insurance is frustrated because the risk of 
loss was not truly transferred from the policyholder to the insurer.  The net 
result in situations where a person is uninsured or is underpaid for his 
losses is that both the person and society are in a worse position because 
the person or its business could be financially devastated by the losses. 
Another reason that insurance has become central to our lives is the 
concern that innocent victims will go uncompensated in the absence of 
insurance if they are injured.35  Many injured people would not be able to 
pay their medical bills or recover lost wages in the absence of insurance 
because tortfeasors often do not have sufficient assets to adequately 
compensate the people they injure.36  Indeed, ensuring that innocent victims 
will be compensated is the primary reason automobile insurance is 
mandatory in this country.37 
 
 34.  Stempel, supra note 29, at 1499, 1505 (discussing construction contracts that 
require the builder to maintain various types of liability insurance and Amtrak’s insistence 
that the State of Rhode Island “buy $200 million in liability insurance if it wants to extend 
commuter rail service to Warwick and South County”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 35.  See, e.g., Leland R. Gallaspy, Breland v. Schilling: Louisiana’s Approach to 
“Injuries Expected or Intended from the Standpoint of the Insured”, 52 LA. L. REV. 199, 
200 (1991) (detailing the public policy rationale for providing insurance in the case of tort 
victims); Karen Cuttler, Liability Insurance for Intentional Torts—Subrogation of the 
Insurer to the Victim’s Rights Against the Insured: Ambassador Insurance Co. v. Montes, 32 
RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 157 (1979) (describing the deterrent effect of financial responsibility 
on potential tortfeasors’ decisions); see also Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 
(N.D. Okla. 2010) (stating that compensating a wrongdoer’s innocent victims would 
outweigh the concern that the wrongdoer would unjustly benefit); St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 163–64 (E.D. Va. 1993) (the public policy of 
compensating innocent victims outweighs the public policy of not permitting coverage of 
intentional action); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (“[T]here is great public interest in protecting the interests of the injured party.”). 
 36.  See generally Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 603, 607 (2006) (noting how commonplace being judgment-proof is as a result of the 
laws). 
 37.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 29, at 1498 (noting how every state effectively 
requires auto insurance in order to license a car); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 924–
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Because of its importance to society today, insurance has become a 
huge industry with global premiums exceeding $4 trillion with the United 
States alone accounting for 28% of that amount.38  Accounting for 7% of 
the world’s gross domestic product, the insurance industry has grown to 
become one of the largest and most important industries in the world.39 
So, what has happened now that insurance has become one of the 
largest and most important industries in the world and is dominated by 
publicly traded stock companies?  As is discussed in the next two parts, 
insurers, as all publicly traded stock companies strive to do, have dedicated 
themselves to increasing their profits for the benefit of their shareholders.  
They have done so by:  (1) reducing the coverage that is provided under 
their broadest policy forms; (2) refusing to insure the people and entities 
for which they cannot charge premiums high enough to meet their target 
profit margins; and (3) reducing their primary expenses—the amounts they 
pay for their policyholders’ losses.  All of these actions are in conflict with 
the purpose of insurance. 
III. INSURERS’ REFUSAL TO INSURE RISKS OR ENTITIES THAT 
DO NOT PRODUCE CONSISTENT PROFITS IN BOTH THE 
SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM 
In this part, to illustrate how the profit imperative has impacted 
insurers’ behavior, several examples of insurers’ reduction of the scope of 
coverage provided under the broadest forms of commercial liability and 
property policies sold is discussed first.  Then, insurers’ claims handling 
conduct under both consumer and commercial lines of insurance is 
addressed. 
A. Insurers’ Contraction of Coverage Provided Under Comprehensive 
General Liability Policies 
A prime example of insurers systematically reducing the coverage 
their policies provide in pursuit of profits can be seen when one reviews the 
history of the Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy.  The CGL 
policy, which was renamed the “Commercial” General Liability insurance 
policy by insurers in 1986 in order to avoid the broad coverage 
implications of the word “comprehensive,” was first created in the 1940s.40  
 
25 (stating that the obvious purpose of such mandatory coverage is to provide victims of 
automobile accidents with access to funds to cover their losses). 
 38.  JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 18. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing The Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability And 
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Although the first CGL policy was sold in 1941, the policy form that 
became widely used was first issued in 1943.41  The two rating bureaus that 
initially created the CGL policy eventually merged and became the 
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO).42 
Prior to 1943, there were numerous different lines of liability 
insurance available to cover specific risks such as Public Liability 
Insurance and Premises Operations Insurance that were issued by various 
insurers with varying policy language.43  Due to the numerous specific lines 
of insurance available, policyholders were able to purchase only the 
specific lines of insurance they needed, which meant insurers had a 
customer base of only policyholders who believed they had a meaningful 
risk of loss under each of the selected lines of insurance.44  The CGL policy 
was created to broaden the insurance pool and to address other problems 
associated with splintered lines of coverage such as insurers’ use of 
differing terms and conditions in their policies.45  As is still the case today 
with almost all insurance policies, the terms of CGL policies were drafted 
by insurers, set forth in lengthy, complex contracts of adhesion, and then 
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.46 
 
Insurance After Three Decades Of Dispute, 12 Conn. Ins. L. J. 349, 355 (2006); see, e.g., E. 
W. SAWYER, COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE, Chs. 2–3 (1943) (describing the merger 
of the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MIRB) and National Bureau of Casualty and Surety 
Underwriters (NBCSU) to form the Insurance Services Office (ISO)).  Sawyer was an 
attorney for the NBSCU. 
 41.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 355. 
 42.  Id.  ISO is an influential organization within the insurance industry that 
promulgates standard form insurance policies, including CGL policies that insurers across 
the country use to conduct their business. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 
871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007).  In particular, the organization develops its own standard policy 
forms and makes them available to its member insurers, which then adopt them and present 
them to state insurance regulators for approval.  See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (discussing the ISO’s role in crafting traditional CGL insurance).  ISO 
is comprised of approximately 1400 property and casualty insurers and “is the almost 
exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance.” Id.  As a result, 
“most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on [ISO] forms.” Id. 
 43.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 356; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 11–17. 
 44.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 356; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 12–18. 
 45.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 356; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 16. 
 46.  See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 
4.06[b] at 4–37 (Aspen 2d ed. 1999) (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one of 
‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior 
to contract formation.”); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested 
Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1072, 1091 (2010) (describing the 
“hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance 
Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?  Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard policy that is generally customized to the 
consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet . . . . [T]here is little, if any, freedom to 
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When created, the CGL policy became the broadest form of liability 
coverage that could be purchased because the insurer agrees under CGL 
policies to pay “all sums” for which the policyholder becomes liable for 
“bodily injuries” or “property damage” caused by an accident.47  Despite 
the expansive coverage grant, insurers embraced the CGL policy because 
they were able to charge higher premiums and could avoid situations where 
policyholders only purchased the lines of coverage under which the 
policyholders thought they most likely would have claims.48  In addition, 
because insurers often would not have to pay claims until many years after 
the premiums for such policies had been paid, insurers would be able to 
earn investment income on the premiums until funds were needed to pay 
claims.49  The insurers’ profits created by this delay are referred to as the 
“float.”  Warren Buffet has famously acknowledged that Berkshire-
Hathaway earns most of its profits from the “float,” as opposed to 
underwriting profits (i.e., the amount of premiums collected that exceed the 
amount paid for claims).50  Indeed, in 2007, for example, insurers made $58 
billion in investment income.51 
Under the CGL policy forms used between 1943 and 1966, the 
 
negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of 
coverage.”); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 
(2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on 
the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Policies, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263 (2011) (citing sources that discuss the standardization of insurance 
policies and then arguing homeowners insurance policies are not as standardized as other 
lines of insurance); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) 
(“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are standardized across insurers in a form 
few insureds have the power or experience to bargain around.”). 
 47.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 358. 
 48.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 358; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 115; John H. Eglof, 
Liability Insurance, The Outside 42 BEST’S FIRE AND CASUALTY NEWS  19 (May 1941) 
(arguing that the bundling of different lines of liability insurance into a comprehensive 
policy would enable insurers to obtain higher premiums because they would not need to sell 
different lines of liability insurance).  Eglof was the Supervisor of the Agency Field Service 
of the Travelers Insurance Company. 
 49.  See, e.g., MARK R. GREEN, RISK AND INSURANCE 147 (4th ed. 1977) (“In property 
and liability insurance, investment income has accounted for a very substantial portion of 
total profits and has served to offset frequent underwriting losses.”); Eliot Martin Blake, 
Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information 
Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) (“Insurers do not simply hang onto premiums, 
of course; they invest them for the time period between payment of premiums and payment 
of losses . . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance] industry is particularly 
important.  Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry to remain 
profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”). 
 50.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 357, n. 18; FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 16. 
 51.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 16. 
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policies covered liabilities “caused by accident.”52  The term “accident” 
was not defined, and thus courts were left to determine what constituted an 
“accident.”53  As the case law developed, courts increasingly concluded that 
“accidents” were not confined in time and space to a single event and could 
include injury-producing events that took place over longer spans of time.54 
As a result of the judicial trend in the case law, among other reasons, 
the CGL policy form was revised in 1966 to substitute the term 
“occurrence” for the term “accident.”55  The term “occurrence” was defined 
as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions 
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”56  Significantly, the change to 
the “occurrence” form meant that it became undisputed that insurance 
coverage was provided not only for events, but also for gradual, ongoing or 
continuous injury situations.  Indeed, according to one insurer 
representative, the change to the “occurrence” policy form made it clear 
that: 
The definition [of “occurrence”] embraces an injurious exposure 
to conditions which results in injury.  Thus, it is no longer 
necessary that the event causing the injury be sudden in 
character.  In most cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the 
exposure.  However, in some other cases, injuries will take place 
over a long period of time before they become manifest.  The 
slow ingestion of foreign matters and inhalation of noxious fumes 
are examples of injuries of this kind.  The definition serves to 
identify the time of loss for application of coverage in these 
cases, viz, the injury must take place during the policy period.  
This means that in exposure-type cases, cases involving 
cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come into 
 
 52.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 363. 
 53.  Id. at 363–64. 
 54.  Compare Jackson v. Employers Liab. Ass. Co., 248 N.Y.S. 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1931), aff’d, 259 N.Y 559 (1932) (an “accident” must be confined in time and space) with 
Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 SE. 2d 72, 75–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (an 
“accident” may take place over time). See also ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY 
INSURANCE §1.22, 1–91 (1985) (“[t]he insurance industry concluded that insurance should 
be afforded to the public on certain kinds of risk which would cover injuries resulting from 
exposure to harmful conditions over a period of time”; Stempel, supra note 40, at 363 
(“when the asbestos mass tort arrived, the basic contractual and legal framework of 
coverage determination combined with the peculiarities of asbestos to require coverage 
beyond that anticipated by insurers when they first accepted the risk”). 
 55.  John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS. 
COUNS. J. 223, 223 (1966) (“The principal reason given for revision of the policies [from the 
1955 form to the 1966 form] was adverse court decisions.”); Stempel, supra note 40, at 364. 
 56.  Id. (quoting a leading insurance company representative). 
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play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy.57 
In short, coverage was triggered if an injury or damage took place during 
the policy period whether or not the “accident” causing the injury or 
damage occurred at that time. 
At the time the 1966 CGL policy form was adopted, a CGL workbook 
used by a major property/casualty insurer gave the following example of an 
“occurrence” that would be covered under the policy: 
Wilson Chemical Company, the named insured, occupies the 
second floor of a commercial building owned by West End 
Cleaners.  The West End operation occupies the entire first floor.  
Wilson Chemical used acid as a raw material.  The acid is stored 
in 100 gallon drums on the second floor.  One storage drum 
developed a leak allowing acid to drip onto the floor.  This 
eventually caused extensive damage to several structural supports 
of the building and caused a partial collapse which destroyed 
much of West End’s equipment.  West End Cleaners brought a 
suit against Wilson Chemical for the replacement of their 
equipment.  Would Wilson’s CGL policy pay? 
 
Yes.  This situation would meet the second part of the definition 
of occurrence, as the slow leak of acid constitutes a continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions.58 
Thus, under the 1966 CGL policy form, insurers understood that long-tail 
claims such as environmental claims were covered regardless of whether 
the damage occurred gradually over time (e.g., due to “continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions”) or abruptly (e.g., due to a spill) so long 
as the damage was not expected or intended by the policyholder.59 
Another significant feature of CGL policies at this time was the fact 
that such policies generally did not have aggregate limits except for 
“products” and “completed operations.”60  Without an aggregate limit, an 
insurer could be required to pay the maximum per occurrence limit in the 
 
 57.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 368 (quoting Norman Nachman, The New Policy 
Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199–200 (1965) 
(Nachman was the manager of non-automobile casualty insurance and multiple lines 
insurance at the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters)). 
 58.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 372 (quoting THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY 
POLICY WORKBOOK 11–12 (1973)) (title caps eliminated). 
 59.  See, e.g., Morton International, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 849–
71 (N.J. 1993) (discussing in great detail the evidence, commentators’ views and case law 
regarding the issue of whether the 1966 CGL policy form covered environmental 
contamination). 
 60.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 376, 381–85 (discussing the absence of an 
aggregate limit for general operations coverage under the CGL). 
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policy over and over again.  Thus, an insurer with, for example, a $1 
million per occurrence limit could be required to pay tens of millions of 
dollars in claims under a single policy if multiple occurrences gave rise to 
the liabilities. 
1. Insurers’ Creation of “Pollution” Exclusions to Avoid Covering 
Environmental Damage 
Because policyholders’ potential exposure for environmental 
liabilities was extremely limited in the late 1960s under the existing laws 
when the new “occurrence” CGL policy was created,61 insurers 
aggressively marketed the policy on the basis that it provided coverage for 
unintentional environmental damage.62  For example, in explaining whether 
the 1966 CGL policy form covered unintentional, gradual environmental 
damage, Gilbert Bean, a former executive of a major insurer and a member 
of the General Liability Rating Committee that was in charge of reviewing 
and drafting policy language, wrote: 
Manufacturing risks producing insecticides, plant foods, 
fertilizers, weed killers, paints, chemicals, thermostats or other 
regulatory devices, to name a few, have severe gradual [property 
damage] exposure. They need this protection and should 
legitimately expect to be able to buy it, so we have included it.63 
In another insurance industry paper, Mr. Bean stated the following with 
respect to the issue of whether the new CGL policy form covered 
environmental claims: 
[There is] coverage for gradual [bodily injury] or gradual 
[property damage] resulting over a period of time from exposure 
to the insured’s waste disposal.  Examples would be gradual 
adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or stream pollution, 
 
 61.  See, e.g., DONALD STERVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE §5.1, at 5–7 (1988) (noting that, prior to the passage of Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, there was little regulation of hazardous wastes). 
 62.  See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W. 2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990) (“At least 
with respect to environmental claims, contemporaneous industry commentary on the 1966 
CGL policy indicates that there was no intent to avoid coverage for unexpected or 
unintended pollution.”). See also Thomas Reiter, David Strasser, and William Pohlman, The 
Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1191–
93 (1991) (discussing the scope of coverage under “occurrence” CGL policies). 
 63.  Gilbert Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program, The Effect 
on Manufacturing Risks, presented at Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15–18, 
1965), quoted in Robert Saylor & David Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the 
CGL Drafters: The Effect of Living Backwards, 1 Mealey’s Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 4425, 4432 
(1987). 
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contamination of water supply or vegetation.  We are all aware of 
cases such as contamination of oyster beds, lint in the water 
intake of downstream industrial sites, the Donora, Pa. 
atmospheric contamination, and the like.64 
The insurers’ championing of the 1966 CGL policy form on the basis 
that it provided coverage for unintentional, gradual environmental damage 
did not, however, last long.  With the adoption by most states of strict 
liability under §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965,65 
followed by the enactment of the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act 
of 1970,66 which imposed strict liability for certain discharges into bodies 
of water, a new regime of environmental regulation and liability was on the 
horizon.  These legal developments, combined with several significant 
environmental incidents such as the Torrey Canyon disaster and the Santa 
Barbara offshore oil spill in the same time period,67 prompted the insurance 
industry in the late 1960s to draft a specific exclusion for offshore oil 
contamination incidents68 and a qualified pollution exclusion for CGL 
policies in order to project a public image that insurers did not protect 
intentional polluters.69 
The qualified pollution exclusion, which also is known as the “sudden 
and accidental” pollution exclusion, was first introduced in 1970 as an 
endorsement and then became part of the CGL policy form itself in 1973.70  
 
 64.  Gilbert Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage Under New CGL Policies With 
Necessary Limitation To Make This Broadening Possible, Paper (1966), quoted in Saylor & 
Zolensky, supra note 63, at 4438 n. 34. 
 65.  WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON ON TORTS §98, at 692–94 (5th ed. 1984). 
 66.  Pub. L. No. 91-224, §102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§1161) (superseded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §2, Pub. 
L. No. 92-500, 88 Stat. 816 (1972)). 
 67.  See, e.g., James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 
15 FORUM 551, 553 (1980) (“Pollution claims burst on the insurance scene following the 
Torrey Canyon disaster and the Santa Barbara office-short drilling oil spills in 1969.”); 
Warren Brockmeier, Pollution—The Risk and Insurance Problem, 12 FOR THE DEFENSE 77, 
77–78 (1971) (discussing changes to CGL coverage after 1960s disasters). 
 68.  See Brockmeier, supra note 67, at 78 (noting that the General Liability Governing 
Committee of the Insurance Rating Board adopted an exclusion for oil contamination of 
water on October 28, 1969); ROWLAND LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §10A.04(2) 
(Bender ed. 1990) (quoting the wording of the exclusion). 
 69.  See, e.g., Letter from David E. Kuizenga, Secretary, Mutual Insurance Rating 
Bureau, to Samuel H. Weese, West Virginia Insurance Commissioner (July 30, 1970), 
quoted in Bradbury, Original Intent, Revisionism and the Meaning of the CGL Policies, 1 
ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 279, 286–87 (1988) (“It is in the public interest that willful pollution of 
any type be stopped . . . . If the insurance industry were to support continued pollution by 
providing coverage . . . it would be considered as aiding and abetting these polluters, 
thereby placing the insurance industry in public disfavor.”). 
 70.  See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1196–1200 (discussing the sudden and 
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It was worded as follows: 
This insurance does not apply. . . . (f) to bodily injury or property 
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape 
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, 
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants 
or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water 
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental 
. . . .71 
When the qualified pollution exclusion was first introduced and 
insurers sought regulatory approval for its use in the early 1970s, insurers 
represented to state insurance regulators that it was not a restriction on the 
existing coverage for environmental damage under the CGL policy form.72  
And, as discussed above, it was undisputed that the existing policy 
language covered gradual pollution if it was unexpected and unintended.73  
Consequently, insurers did not reduce the premium rates charged for CGL 
policies when they added the qualified pollution exclusion to them.74 
Insurers’ position regarding the scope and meaning of the qualified 
pollution exclusion changed, however, following the enactment of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)75 in 1976, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
of 1980 (CERCLA), and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA) (collectively known as the “Superfund” laws).76  The 
Superfund laws imposed retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability 
for the remediation of environmental damage on any entity that was:  (1) 
the current owner and operator of the disposal facility, (2) the owner or 
 
accidental” pollution exclusion); INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. GL 00 02 01 73, 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in 
DONALD S. MALECKI, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE GUIDE, App. A (9th ed. 
2011). 
 71.  INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. GL 00 02 01 73, COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 70, at 
App. A. 
 72.  See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1200–05 (discussing insurance industry 
representations regarding the qualified pollution exclusion); Morton, 629 A.2d at 848–53 
(discussing insurance industry’s explanatory memoranda of the pollution exclusion clause); 
Joy Technologies, 421 S.E. 2d at 498–99 (discussing the IRB’s explanatory memorandum of 
the pollution exclusion clause). 
 73.  See supra notes 57–59, 62–64, and the accompanying text. 
 74.  See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1202; Morton, 629 A.2d at 848, 853. 
 75.  Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980); Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Act Amendments, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984) (current versions of both amendments are at 
42 U.S.C. §§690–6992 (1988)). 
 76.  42 U.S.C. §§960–9675 (1988). 
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operator of the disposal facility at the time of the disposal, (3) the entity 
that arranged for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance, or (4) 
the transporter of a hazardous substance even if the entity handled the 
chemicals and wastes in accordance with all of the historical laws and 
industry standards.77 
With the enactment of Superfund, policyholders were faced with a 
total cleanup bill of several hundred billion dollars.78  When policyholders 
turned to their CGL insurers to request payment of such liabilities, insurers’ 
response was multipronged:  (1) notwithstanding the drafting history of the 
qualified pollution exclusion and their representations to state insurance 
regulators regarding the impact the exclusion had on coverage, they took 
the position that the exclusion precluded coverage for any and all 
environmental liabilities unless such liabilities resulted from an “abrupt” 
release of contaminants;79 (2) after losing a number of cases regarding the 
meaning of the qualified pollution exclusion, they promptly drafted a new 
“absolute” pollution exclusion that was intended to preclude coverage for 
all environmental liabilities regardless of whether the environmental 
damage was unexpected and unintended or caused by abrupt releases;80 and 
(3) they litigated every other defense they could conceive in an all-out war 
with their policyholders to avoid covering their policyholders’ 
environmental liabilities.81  The battle between insurers and their 
policyholders regarding coverage for environmental claims lasted many 
 
 77.  See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 
1987) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of strict and joint and several liability); O’Neil v. 
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA’s retroactive and joint and 
several liability); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(discussing the same). 
 78.  See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1171 (citing estimated industry liability for 
cleanup of $150 billion to $700 billion). 
 79.  See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1174 (noting that insurers generally argue 
that “sudden” means “abrupt.”); Morton, 629 A.2d at 852 (noting that insurers in litigation 
excepted from the pollution exclusion clause discharge of pollutants that was “sudden” or 
abrupt). 
 80.  INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. CG 00 01 11 85, COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, Exclusion (f) (1986), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 70, at 
App. B; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” 
Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & 
INS. L. J. 1, 2, 5–6 (1998). 
 81.  See, e.g., PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, 
POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE §§ 3.02, 3.03, 5.02, 5.03, 
10.03, 10.04 (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2013) (discussing insurers’ arguments and the resulting 
case law regarding insurers’ defenses to coverage based upon the “other insurance” clause, 
allocation, number of “occurrences,” the terms “legally obligated to pay” and “damages,” 
the “owned property” exclusion and the qualified pollution exclusion in environmental 
insurance coverage disputes). 
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years82 and resulted in the creation of an extensive body of common law 
regarding numerous issues and provisions contained in CGL policies due to 
the breadth of the defenses insurers asserted to coverage.83  In short, when 
faced with billions of dollars of liabilities that insurers previously had 
stated were of a type covered by their policies, the profit imperative drove 
insurers to add an exclusion for such claims going forward and to contest 
the payment of the existing claims with all available means and resources. 
2. Insurers’ Creation of an “Asbestos” Exclusion to Avoid Covering 
Asbestos Liabilities 
A similar story can be told regarding insurers’ response to 
policyholders’ presentation of claims for liabilities related to asbestos.  As 
is discussed in the preceding section, when the insurance industry adopted 
the “occurrence”-based CGL policy form in 1966, insurers understood that 
they were agreeing to insure bodily injuries and property damage that took 
place gradually over time.84  Insurers accepted this increased risk exposure 
because of the higher premiums and profits that they could earn.85 
Because tort liabilities are one of the most common types of claims 
that indisputably are covered under CGL policies, however, insurers were 
not well positioned to successfully deny that they were responsible for 
 
 82.  This battle resulted in dozens of law review articles being written regarding the 
meaning and origins of the qualified pollution exclusion.  See generally Nancy Ballard and 
Peter Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability 
Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990) (discussing the meanings and 
applications of “sudden” and “accidental”); Scott C. Stirling, Reasonable Expectations of 
Insurance Coverage and the Problem of Environmental Liabilities, 22 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 395 
(1990) (discussing CGL insurance liability and consumer reasonable expectations); Kenneth 
S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 
(1988) (exploring the ways in which environmental liability has produced more severe and 
enduring effects than those produced by the liability insurance crisis of 1985 and 1986); 
Robert Chesler et. al., Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for 
Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9 (1986) (examining, in the hopes of 
forecasting the outcome of future disputes, liability that arises out of pollution in insurance 
coverage litigation); Richard Hunter, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive 
General Liability Insurance Policy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (examining the general 
principals of insurance law that apply to the pollution exclusion as well as providing a 
history of the exclusion and the CGL policy language that courts have relied on in 
construing the exclusion); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Through 
the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L. J. 1237 (1986) (introducing a new method for judicial 
analysis of whether insurance covers pollution related losses). 
 83.  See KALIS ET. AL., supra note 81, at § 3 (discussing the insurance law related to 
various coverage issues). 
 84.  See supra notes 57–59. 
 85.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 375. 
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paying their policyholders’ asbestos liabilities when asbestos claims began 
being submitted in the 1970s and 1980s.  Consequently, in an attempt to 
minimize their coverage obligations in order to preserve profits for their 
shareholders when faced with what ultimately became billions of dollars of 
liabilities that the insurers had agreed to pay under the policies they 
drafted,86 insurers initially engaged in battles in which each insurer 
challenged whether the injuries at issue occurred during its policy period 
and, if so, how much of the liabilities it, as opposed to other insurers, 
should pay.  This litigation led to the development of the common law 
regarding issues now commonly known as “trigger,” “allocation” and 
“number of occurrences.”87 
Once it became clear, however, that such battles simply had the effect 
of shifting asbestos liabilities from one insurer to another without actually 
decreasing the financial obligations of the insurance industry as a whole for 
such liabilities, the insurance industry did the same thing it did with respect 
to environmental claims—it drafted and adopted an asbestos exclusion that 
initially was used as an endorsement and then became part of the standard 
CGL policy form in 1986.88 
Following the coverage wars between insurers and their policyholders 
and the adoption of the asbestos exclusion, more than seventy 
policyholders went bankrupt as a result of asbestos claims, but there was 
only a 1 to 3% drag on insurers’ earnings and only a handful of insurer 
insolvencies.89  To add insult to injury after first fighting with and then 
abandoning their policyholders with respect to asbestos liabilities, some 
insurers even objected to their policyholders’ bankruptcy reorganization 
plans because insurers would be required to pay claims promptly under 
such plans, thereby depriving the insurers of the “float” income they 
generated by holding onto the policyholders’ premiums for as long as 
possible and paying claims slowly over time.90  Such actions by insurers 
 
 86.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 351 (discussing the billions of dollars in costs 
to insurers from asbestos claims). 
 87.  See, e.g., Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 633 
F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (analyzing when the injury occurs in asbestos cases (i.e., trigger) 
and how much each insurer whose policy is triggered by the injury should pay (i.e., 
allocation)); Keene Corporation v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (discussing the same). For a discussion 
regarding the complexities involved in determining the amount each insurer should be 
obligated to pay when a claim, such as an asbestos claim, triggers coverage in multiple years 
and multiple layers of coverage, see Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: 
An “Other Insurance” Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2011). 
 88.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 464 (discussing asbestos exclusions in the 
CGL policy form). 
 89.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 416–17. 
 90.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 432–33. 
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were dictated by the profit imperative. 
3. Insurers’ Creation of Additional Exclusions to Avoid Paying 
Losses 
Educated by their experiences with asbestos and environmental 
liabilities, insurers have drafted and adopted exclusions for CGL policies to 
eliminate coverage for any risks they anticipate could be unprofitable to 
insure.  Today, the CGL policy form, the broadest form of liability 
insurance that can be purchased, contains the following exclusions:  (1) 
expected or intended injury; (2) contractual liability; (3) liquor liability; (4) 
workers’ compensation claims; (5) employer liability; (6) pollution; (7) 
aircraft, auto and watercraft; (8) mobile equipment; (9) war; (10) owned 
property; (11) damage to your product; (12) damage to your work; (13) 
damage to impaired property; (14) product recall; (15) personal and 
advertising injury; (16) electronic data; and (17) distribution of material in 
violation of statutes.91  In short, the profit imperative has driven insurers to 
restrict the coverage provided today under a policy form originally entitled 
“Comprehensive General Liability Insurance” so substantially that the 
coverage provided under the policy form is no longer even named or 
described as “comprehensive.” 
B. Insurers’ Contraction of Coverage Provided Under “All Risk” 
Property Policies 
A similar story can be told regarding the profit imperative and 
property insurance.  Like CGL policies, which originally were intended to 
provide coverage for all types of liability claims, insurers also sell property 
and homeowners policies that purport to cover “all risks” except for 
specific risks that are expressly excluded.92  In much the same way that 
CGL policies were a consolidation of multiple lines of liability insurance, 
“all risk” property policies evolved from “named peril” policies.  
Historically, “named peril” policies covered one specified peril.  The 
earliest non-marine “named peril” policy was the fire policy, which 
originated in London following the Great Fire of 1666.93 
In the 1940s and 1950s, insurers began to bundle coverage for certain 
 
 91.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., supra note 70, FORM NO. CG 00 01 12 07, at App. J. 
 92.  See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover 
from their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) 
(“In an ‘all-risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered.  This is 
the broadest form of coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.”). 
 93.  KALIS ET AL., supra note 81, at § 13.02[A][1]. 
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named perils together under one policy.  These policies became known as 
“multi-peril” policies.  Under “named peril” or “multi-peril” policies, any 
perils that were not expressly listed as covered were excluded.94 
“All risk” policies were then developed from “multi-peril” policies.95  
Unlike “multi-peril” policies, however, “all risk” policies cover all perils 
unless a peril is specifically excluded.96 
Yet, as was the case with CGL policies, the coverage provided by “all 
risk” policies has eroded over the years as insurers learned that insuring 
certain risks or policyholders were not as profitable as the profit imperative 
demanded.  A few examples of this phenomenon are discussed below. 
1.  Insurers’ Creation of an “Earth Movement” Exclusion to Avoid 
Covering Earthquake Damage 
Insurers have been refusing to cover earthquakes since even before 
“all risk” policies were first created.97  As discussed above, “named peril” 
and “multi-peril” policies only covered perils that were expressly listed so 
there was no coverage for earthquakes under those policies.  Similarly, 
standard form “all risk” homeowners policies98 and commercial property 
policies99 historically have expressly excluded coverage for earthquakes. 
Consequently, in California, a state in which residents acutely need 
earthquake coverage, the state legislature enacted a statute that required 
insurers that sold homeowners insurance in the state to also offer coverage 
 
 94.  Id. § 13.02[A]. 
 95.  Id. § 13.02[B]. 
 96.  See 5 John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice with 
Forms § 3092 (4th prtg., rev. vol. 1987) (providing a background regarding “all risk” 
policies); 3 New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide § 31.06[2][d] (Jeffrey E. Thomas 
et al. eds., 2011) (explaining the difference between a “named perils” policy and an “all 
risks policy”; 10A Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segulla, Couch on Insurance § 148:50 (3d ed. 
1996) (discussing the increasing use of “all risk” policies). 
 97.  See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance 
Policies: The Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation 
Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 216 (2012) (“[In 1906], most property [insurance] policies in 
the U.S. covered losses caused by fire, but also contained an ‘anti-concurrent causation’ 
exclusion that barred coverage for losses caused ‘directly or indirectly’ by earthquakes.”). 
 98.  See, e.g., Brian Mattis, Earth Movement Claims Under All Risk Insurance: The 
Rules Have Changed in California, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 36–37 (1990) (citing State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co.’s Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 7, Form FP-7103). 
 99.  See, e.g., INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. CP 10 20 06 07, COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTY BROAD FORM, EXCLUSION (B) (2007), reprinted in BRUCE J. HILLMAN, 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY, 404–05 (Susan Massmann, 4th ed. 201009) (“[w]e will not pay for 
loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [an] [e]arthquake, including any earth 
sinking, rising or shifting related to such event”). 
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for earthquakes.100  So long as there were no earthquakes that resulted in 
significant losses, insurers were willing to accept that requirement. 
That, of course, changed in 1994 following the Northridge earthquake.  
In less than a minute on January 17, 1994, insurers incurred over $12 
billion in losses due to the Northridge earthquake in Southern California.101  
In response, 93% of homeowners insurers in California either stopped 
writing homeowners insurance or imposed strict limits on the policies that 
they were willing to sell.102  And the insurers that did not completely 
abandon California demanded significantly higher premium rates.103  For 
example, State Farm requested a 97.2% rate increase.104  Due to insurers’ 
refusal to accept the risk of losses for earthquakes in California because 
they did not view homeowners insurance as an adequately profitable line of 
insurance for them in the short term if they could not exclude coverage for 
earthquake losses, the State of California was forced to assume the primary 
responsibility for insuring earthquake losses in most parts of the state.105 
As discussed further below in Part III.B, insurers justify their refusal 
to insure catastrophic risks such as earthquakes on the basis that the losses 
are essentially “uninsurable” because the risks of loss are highly correlated 
(i.e., they happen in concentrated areas and thus, insurers are not able to 
adequately spread the risk of loss across a large enough pool of 
policyholders to cover the losses when they occur).106  Although such 
losses are correlated, that does not necessarily mean they are uninsurable.  
Indeed, regardless of the merits of such arguments in past decades, this 
justification is fading today due to reinsurance and catastrophe bonds.  
Reinsurance is now a worldwide business in which global reinsurers 
actually insure all or portions of another insurer’s portfolio of business 
(known as “treaty” reinsurance),107 which means that the risk of an 
earthquake loss in California, for example, is spread across policyholders 
located not only in California, but also in distant places such as Australia 
 
 100.  See Cal. Ins. Code § 10081 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (requiring 
earthquake coverage in residential property insurance issued in California). 
 101.  Daniel L. Keller, Insurance; earthquake insurance—availability, 27 PAC. L.J. 867 
(1996). 
 102.  Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, 
and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 205 (1997). 
 103.  Id. at 215. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure, and Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against 
Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 195–96 (2012) (describing government intervention in 
insurance through California’s CEA, which bears the primary earthquake risk in California). 
 106.  See, e.g., Cummins, supra note 4, at 342–43; Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 
187. 
 107.  Id. 
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and Europe.  Further, catastrophes do not regularly recur in the exact same 
location so insurers collect many years, if not decades, of premiums from 
policyholders in a location ultimately impacted by a catastrophe before the 
catastrophe occurs.108  Insurers today also can further spread the risk of loss 
through the sale of catastrophe bonds, pursuant to which insurers sell bonds 
for specific types of catastrophes such as earthquakes and hurricanes to 
investors who receive interest payments on the bonds and the return of their 
principal at the end of the bond term unless the specified catastrophe 
occurs, in which case the insurer keeps the principal and ceases to make 
interest payments on the bonds.  Since 1996, insurers have spread their 
risks through the issuance of $51 billion in catastrophe bonds, with only 
$682 million in losses or only 1.3% of the amount issued.109  Thus, in order 
to tenably advance the argument that the risk of losses caused by 
earthquakes in California cannot be spread across a large enough pool of 
policyholders to be actuarially sound at the allowable premium rates, one 
must take a narrow view of both the relevant time period in which to 
evaluate the profitability of the premiums and investment income earned 
versus the losses paid and discount the risk spreading impact that 
reinsurance and catastrophe bonds have on the relevant pool of 
policyholders and investors across which the risk of loss is spread. 
Nonetheless, regardless of the strength of the argument that 
catastrophic losses such as earthquakes are “uninsurable” due to the highly 
correlated nature of the losses, the fact remains that most private insurers 
do not want to sell insurance to cover earthquake losses so states, such as 
California, that want their citizens to have coverage for such losses 
generally must provide it themselves. 
2. Insurers’ Creation of a “Flood” Exclusion to Avoid Covering 
Flood Damage 
The insurance industry’s refusal to insure the risk of loss due to floods 
is another tale of profits over purpose.  Largely due to waterways 
historically serving as a means of transportation, this country developed 
along waterways, with the largest cities and population centers being 
located on the coasts or along rivers.  With water, however, comes periodic 
flooding despite humans’ best efforts to prevent it.  Indeed, the plain states 
are fertile farming lands due to the fact that rivers, such as the Mississippi 
 
 108.  See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 206, 208. 
 109.  See Al Yoon and Leslie Scism, Yield Hunt’s Latest Twist: ‘Catastrophe Bonds’, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2014, at C2 (“Natural disasters have saddled cat bonds with $682 
million in losses since 1996, or 1.3% of the $51 billion issued . . . .”). 
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River, enrich the soil in the surrounding areas by periodically flooding.110 
Historically, the risk of loss due to flooding was not excluded under 
“all risk” homeowners and commercial property policies.111  The losses 
caused by floods over the years, however, have been extraordinary and 
cause billions of dollars a year in damages.112  Indeed, nine out of ten 
catastrophes in the United States each year are due to flooding.113 
As is revealed by the preceding discussion regarding environmental, 
asbestos and earthquake losses, when the damages associated with a 
potential risk of loss are high, insurers lose their appetites for insuring such 
risks.  Consequently, by the 1960s, insurers had seen enough of flood 
losses that they decided insuring losses due to flooding generally was not a 
risk they wanted to accept for several reasons:  (1) the near certainty of 
losses in some areas; (2) the ruinous, widespread nature of flooding events; 
and (3) the propensity of entities most likely to suffer from flooding losses 
to purchase coverage for flooding while those unlikely to suffer such losses 
decline to purchase such coverage.114  As a result, despite selling “all risk” 
homeowners and commercial property policies, insurers almost uniformly 
have refused to insure flood losses since the 1960s.115 
Thus, the government again was left to fill the void created by 
 
 110.  See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons 
from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1477 (2007) (“As on many 
rivers, seasonal floods are natural, life-giving occurrences on the Mississippi River. Periodic 
flooding allows the river to deposit rich soils outside its channel . . . .”); Adam F. Scales, A 
Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. 
L. REV. 3, 6 (2007) (“The fertile soils of the alluvial plain constituted a tremendous resource 
. . . .”); Edward V.A. Kussy, Wetland and Floodplain Protection and the Federal-Aid 
Highway Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 161, 176 (1982) (discussing the positive role flooding has 
in fertilizing wetlands). 
 111.  See, e.g., Scales, supra note 110, at 7 (explaining the historic practice of including 
flood losses in “all risk” policies). 
 112.  See, e.g., Scales, supra note 110, at 6 (explaining the extent of the losses due to 
flooding); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 63, 66 (1985). 
 113.  Houck, supra note 112, at 62. 
 114.  Warren Kriesel and Craig Landry, Participation in the National Flood Insurance 
Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. RISK & INS. 405, 405 (2004); 
See Scales, supra note 110, at 8–9 (explaining the contributing factors to the market failure 
for flood insurance). 
 115.  Kriesel and Landry, supra note 114, at 405.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom 
that no private insurers will provide coverage for the risk of flooding, for the right price and 
for the right policyholders, there are some insurers that are still willing to provide limited 
coverage under commercial property policies for floods.  See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 662 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Dec. 19, 
2011) (litigating whether the policyholder, whose manufacturing facility was located on the 
banks of the Cedar River, had $50 million or $20 million in coverage for flood losses under 
an “all risk” commercial property policy issued by AIG and ACE). 
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insurers’ refusal to cover flood losses.  In this instance, the void has been 
filled by the federal government through the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) that was initiated through the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968.116  Unfortunately, the NFIP has not been a model for success.  
Historically, it has suffered from low participation rates and has been 
subject to widespread criticism due to problems such as the subsidization of 
premium rates, outdated flood maps, periods of insolvency and inadequate 
compensation amounts for losses due to the poor coverage provided under 
the NFIP policy and the $250,000 liability cap under the program.117  The 
recently passed Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was 
intended to address these problems.118  Only time will tell if the 2012 
amendments to the Act will be effective, but it is clear that the profit 
imperative is the reason private insurers refuse to cover flood losses. 
3. Insurers’ Attempts to Refuse to Cover Hurricanes/Windstorms 
What about hurricanes?  In light of insurers’ history of exiting lines of 
insurance for risks that have or may result in substantial claims, hurricanes 
would certainly seem to be the type of risk that insurers would prefer not to 
insure.  There were $23 billion in losses caused by Hurricane Andrew in 
1992.119  Hurricane Katrina caused $43 billion in losses in 2005.120  Also in 
2005, Hurricane Wilma caused $23 billion in losses.121 
Not surprisingly, even though insurers already exclude coverage for 
the “flood” portion of damage caused by hurricanes,122 insurers also have 
sought, with some success, to completely exit the insurance market for 
wind damage caused by hurricanes.123  Indeed, when state insurance 
 
 116.  42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 et seq. (2012). 
 117.  See, e.g., Kriesel and Landry, supra note 114, at 406–07; Cummins, supra note 4, 
at 358; Beth A. Dickhaus and Darrin N. Sacks, Recent Developments in Insurance 
Regulation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 571, 582 (2007). 
 118.  See Pub. L. 112–141, Div. F, Title II, § 100249, July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 969 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et. seq.).  It remains to be seen whether actuarially sound 
premium rates will ever be charged because several coastal states successfully lobbied 
against the new premiums rates that would be charged to their residents such that Congress 
recently passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which delays 
the full implementation of actuarially sound premium rates mandated by Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.  See Pub. L. 113–89, § 2, Mar. 21, 2014, 128 Stat. 
1020 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et. seq.). 
 119.  Cassandra R. Cole, et. al., The Use of Post-Loss Financing of Catastrophic Risk, 14 
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 265, 266 (2011). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See, Part II.B.2, supra (highlighting the flood exclusions in insurance policies). 
 123.  See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Natural Disasters and the Financing of Fat Tails: 
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commissioners have refused to approve the premium rates that insurers 
claim they need in order to meet their profit margin goals in coastal states, 
insurers have simply refused to sell the insurance, unless the government 
intervenes to prevent them from doing so.124  In Florida, for example, 
insurers attempted to exit the market for hurricane coverage after Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992, but legislation was passed to temporarily prevent them 
from doing so.125  More recently, after the legislative prohibition expired, 
most major private insurers have been refusing to insure coastal 
properties.126  Consequently, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, a 
state sponsored insurance company, is by far the largest property insurer in 
Florida.127 
Like Florida, the states of Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas also have been forced to create 
hurricane insurance plans due to the lack of availability of affordable 
insurance coverage from private insurers.128  Insurers typically are required 
to contribute to such plans as a condition to being allowed to sell insurance 
in the state.129  Thus, although states have taken steps to slow or prevent 
insurers from refusing to cover the wind portion of damage caused by 
hurricanes, it is clear that insurers would not cover any portion of hurricane 
losses in coastal areas if not for legislative requirements. 
Finally, what about tornadoes?  Since 1950, almost 58,000 tornadoes 
have been observed.130  The average annual losses caused by tornadoes 
between 1950 and 2013 were $5.9 billion.131  In recent years, however, 
 
Lessons from the Economics and Political Economy of Weather-Related Insurance, p. 4, 6 
(2013), available at http:\\ssrn.com\abstract=2249904; Elisabeth A. Ondera, Testing the 
Waters: The South Carolina Coastal Captive Insurance Act As Part of A Multifaceted 
Approach to the Coastal Insurance Conundrum, 59 S.C. L. REV. 599, 600 (2008) 
(explaining instances where insurers have succeeded and failed at exiting the market). 
 124.  Hornstein, supra note 123, at 4 (describing Allstate’s, Farmers Insurance’s and 
Farm Bureau’s withdrawal from the insurance markets in Florida and North Carolina when 
they did not obtain regulatory approval for their requested premium rate increases despite 
the fact that premium rates already had been increased by 77% in Florida between 2001 and 
2006). 
 125.  1993 Fla. Laws, ch. 93–401; Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: 
Assessing the Constitutionality of Florida’s Residential Property Insurance Moratorium 
After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 770 (1995); Jaffee and Russell, supra 
note 102, at 206. 
 126.  Bradley G. Bodiford, Florida’s Unnatural Disaster: Who Will Pay for the Next 
Hurricane?, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 149, 161–62 (2010). 
 127.  Id. at 160. 
 128.  Hornstein, supra note 123, at 2, 6; Ondera, supra note 123, at 601, 605–07. 
 129.  Hornstein, supra note 123, at 6. 
 130.  Roger A. Pielke, Jr., The Decline of Tornado Devastation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 
2014, at A13. 
 131.  Id. 
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tornadoes have caused even more staggering devastation, particularly in the 
“Hurricane Alley” states of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Kansas, 
Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas.  In 2011, for example, tornadoes killed 550 
people and caused $28 billion in property damage.132 
Thus far, insurers have continued to cover tornado losses.  Yet, in light 
of the impact that the profit imperative had on insurers’ response to claims 
for environmental, asbestos, flood, earthquake, and hurricane losses, how 
long can we expect that insurers will voluntarily continue to cover damages 
caused by tornadoes? 
4. Insurers’ Creation of Additional Exclusions to Avoid Covering 
Other Risks as They Have Appeared 
Now, insurers waste little time contemplating how to respond to new 
risks of loss that could impair their profit margins when they appear.  
Instead, ISO quickly drafts exclusions that are immediately added to 
policies to avoid insuring potentially unprofitable risks of loss.  For 
example, as the year 2000 approached, there was wide spread concern 
regarding potential computer crashes because computers had not been 
programmed to turn from 1999 to 2000.  Instead of assuring policyholders 
that they would be covered under their policies in the event of losses due to 
crashing computers, ISO drafted an exclusion for Y2K claims that was 
added by endorsement to property policies well before the ball dropped in 
Times Square on New Year’s Eve of 2000.133 
Similarly, the first case in which a policyholder was awarded 
substantial damages by a jury for mold contamination occurred in 2001.134  
Within a year, ISO had drafted a new mold exclusion for “all risk” 
homeowners and other types of property policies in an attempt to avoid 
paying any claims related to mold in the future.135 
Just a year later in 2002, with the 9/11 terrorist attack losses projected 
to be in the range of $30 to $100 billion,136 ISO quickly drafted and added a 
 
 132.  Kevin M. Simmons, Daniel Sutter, and Roger Pielke, Normalized Tornado 
Damage in the United States: 1950–2011, Environmental Hazards, 1 (2012). 
 133.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 465. 
 134.  See Ballard v. Fire Ins. Exchange, No. 99-05252, 2001 WL 883550 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Aug. 1, 2001) (a homeowner successfully sued her insurer for bad faith handling of a claim 
for mold contamination and was awarded $32 million in total by the jury).  See generally 
Brian Lake, The Empire Strikes Back: The Insurance Industry Battles Toxic Mold, 33 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1527 (2007) (explaining the insurance industry’s response to the 
explosion in mold litigation); Julie Elmer, A Fungus Among Us: The New Epidemic of Mold 
Claims, 64 ALA. L. REV. 109 (2003) (providing a general overview of mold litigation). 
 135.  Stempel, supra note 40, at 466. 
 136.  Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102 
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terrorism exclusion to insurers’ policies.137  To fill the vacuum created by 
insurers’ refusal to cover terrorism losses, and to calm a justifiably shaken 
country, Congress intervened by passing the American Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 under which insurers are required to offer terrorism 
coverage, but the federal government provides free reinsurance subject to a 
$5 million, per occurrence deductible.138 
Today, in addition to excluding coverage for earthquakes, floods and 
mold, ISO’s standard form “all risk” homeowners policy also contains 
exclusions for losses caused by:  (1) collapse; (2) frozen pipes; (3) wear 
and tear; (4) mechanical breakdown; (5) corrosion or dry rot; (6) settling; 
(7) birds, vermin, rodents or insects; (8) ordinance or law; (9) power 
failure; (10) neglect; (11) war; (12) nuclear hazard; (13) intentional loss; 
and (14) governmental action.139  In short, as is the case with CGL policies, 
the profit imperative has reshaped the “all risk” property policy sold by 
insurers to homeowners today so that such policies cover quite a bit less 
than “all” risks. 
C. The Impact of the Profit Imperative on Insurers’ Payment of Claims 
Although insurers’ introduction of exclusions and refusal to insure 
certain risks are examples of the profit imperative overriding the purpose of 
insurance, perhaps the clearest manifestation of this phenomenon today can 
be seen in the way insurers have approached reducing their principal 
expenses—the amounts paid for their policyholders’ losses.  In essence, 
due to the profit imperative, when it comes to paying claims, insurers and 
their policyholders are adversaries.  In the words of one scholar, when it 
comes to paying their policyholders’ losses, insurers do not act like “a good 
neighbor” and policyholders are not in “good hands”.140  When a claim is 
presented, the insurer and the policyholder become adversaries.141  The 
reason is simple:  every dollar an insurer pays on a claim is a dollar that 
does not go to the insurer’s profits.  The payment of claims is a zero-sum 
 
MICH. L. REV. 268, 269 (2003). 
 137.  See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism 
Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 787, 803 (2005); Levmore & Logue, supra note 136, at 276, 
296. 
 138.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) 
(codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.); Boardman, supra note 137, at 788–
89; Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 230. 
 139.  INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. HO 00 03 10 00, HOMEOWNERS POLICY FORM, 
EXCLUSIONS (1999), reprinted in Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law & Regulation, at 
202–06 (5th ed. 2010). 
 140.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 190. 
 141.  Id. 
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game for insurers and policyholders.  Thus, insurers and policyholders are 
competing for the same dollars. 
As the insurance industry became increasingly dominated by publicly 
traded stock companies in the 1990s, insurers did what all successful for-
profit businesses do.  They closely analyzed their revenues and costs, 
looking for ways to increase revenues and to decrease costs.  What insurers 
and their management consultants discovered when they looked at insurers’ 
expenses in the 1990s was that seventy-two cents of every premium dollar 
collected was paid out in claims.142  Consequently, they concluded that in 
order to increase their profits, they had to decrease the amounts paid in 
claims.143  As the Chairman of one insurer explained to its employees in 
1997: 
In the long run, if we don’t win on the claim side of this business 
we don’t win.  Because that’s where all the leverage is.  Three-
quarters of every dollar that leaves this company goes to pay 
claims.  So we have to build a long-term, sustainable competitive 
advantage in claims.  It’s as simple as that.144 
The Vice President of Claims at another insurer described his 
company’s approach to claims payments as follows: 
[W]hat I’m talking about is the loss ratio, because that’s the 
difference between profits and loss . . . . And if our competition 
settles claims for less money than we do, we stand a good chance 
of being non-competitive . . . . Now you all know losses are a 
function of frequency and severity.  You can’t do a whole lot 
about the frequency but severity is strictly in our ballpark.145 
In short, the profit imperative drove insurers to settle claims for less 
money and to build a “sustainable competitive advantage in claims.”146 
The insurance industry’s focus on reducing the amounts it paid in 
claims in order to increase profitability was successful, as demonstrated by 
the industry’s loss ratio, which is the amount paid in claims divided by the 
amount collected in premiums.  The loss ratio went from 67% in 1987 to 
56% in 2007.147  Richard Stewart, the former Superintendent of Insurance 
for New York and President of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, described the transformation that occurred in the insurance 
 
 142.  Id. at 58. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 63 (quoting Allstate Now, 24 (January 1997)). 
 145.  Id. at 64 (quoting State Farm Divisional Claim Superintendents Conference 
(1986)). 
 146.  Id. at 63. 
 147.  Id. at 15. 
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industry regarding the emphasis placed on driving down the amounts paid 
on claims as a shift “from orientation toward policyholders to orientation 
toward stockholders . . . .”148  The end result, of course, is that the 
“stockholders get the benefit of what is not paid out for claims.”149 
1. Insurers’ Claims Payment Practices under Consumer Lines of 
Insurance 
In practice, when it came to implementing the insurers’ focus on 
profitability under consumer lines of insurance, such as auto insurance, the 
basic instruction to claims handlers was to “deny everything you can.”150  
In addition, claims handlers were no longer evaluated on the basis of how 
accurately claims were being valued or how satisfied policyholders were 
with the claims adjustment process, but rather, “based on the average 
amount we paid out in claims.”151  Claims handlers were instructed “to 
close a set percentage of claims without payment” and “to estimate the 
condition of damaged vehicles at or below the national average to minimize 
indemnity payments,” which, of course, meant the claims handlers were 
being instructed to deny some claims and lower the amount paid on other 
claims without regard to the true value of the claims.152  Claims handlers 
were also instructed to try to settle claims before the policyholder retained 
counsel because policyholders represented by counsel recovered 90% more 
than unrepresented policyholders.153 
With respect to some soft tissue injuries, such as whiplash, which 
generally were viewed with suspicion by insurers, one insurer adopted a 
policy of “forcing soft tissue cases through arbitration and trial for the 
purpose of sending a message to claimants, their attorneys, and the public 
in general, that it is simply not profitable to pursue a soft tissue case when 
[we are] the insurer.”154  The insurer’s policy was effective because the 
average amount it paid on whiplash claims declined by 38%, from $4,500 
to $2,783.155  The cumulative effect on the insurer’s bottom line was 
dramatic, with the insurer’s profits increasing by over $100 million.156 
Insurers also began using computer programs to value claims instead 
 
 148.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 47–48 (quoting Richard E. Stewart and Barbara D. 
Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty Effect, RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 4, 29 (2001)). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 77 (quoting Declaration of William R. Hurst, (December 29, 2003)). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 79. 
 153.  Id. at 88. 
 154.  Id. at 97 (quoting Affidavit of Grace Hess (March 12, 1998)). 
 155.  Id. at 100. 
 156.  Id. 
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of trained people.  As with any computer program, it could be programmed 
to consider whatever data was input.  With the profit imperative in mind, 
one insurer programmed the system to omit jury verdicts and settlements 
that exceeded $50,000 when valuing claims because “profits would go up” 
by lowering the average claim payments and executives would receive 
significant bonuses as a result.157  Another insurer decided to pay only 80% 
of the value of claims as calculated by the computer program.158 
In addition, the profit imperative also has encouraged insurers to delay 
the payment of losses they agreed to pay or were forced to pay for as long 
as possible.  Because of the “float”—the investment income earned on 
premiums before the premiums are used to pay claims—it is now the 
standard operating procedure for insurers to hold onto the money for as 
long as possible before paying.159 
2. Insurers’ Claims Payment Practices under Commercial Lines of 
Insurance 
The profit imperative has driven insurers to behave similarly with 
respect to commercial lines of insurance.  The biggest differences, 
however, are that the amounts at issue are often larger and corporate 
policyholders, unlike consumers, frequently have the financial resources to 
fight when insurers refuse to pay claims or attempt to settle claims for 
pennies on the dollar. 
Unlike individual consumers, corporate policyholders typically have 
liability and property insurance programs that have multiple layers of 
coverage which total tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of coverage in 
each policy year, and some of their claims are worth tens or hundreds of 
millions of dollars.160  Consider, for example, long-tail claims such as 
environmental and asbestos liabilities discussed above in Part II.A.  
Because the losses at issue totaled billions of dollars in the aggregate, 
insurers fought their policyholders over every dollar using every legal 
 
 157.  Id. at 117 (quoting Affidavit of Maureen Reed (April 12, 2003)). 
 158.  Id. at 118. 
 159.  See supra notes 50, 51, 90 (explaining “float” and its use by insurers).  See also 
FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 16, 28, 32 (explaining risk aversion in the insurance industry). 
 160.  French, supra note 87, at 378–79 (discussing the structure of corporate 
policyholders’ insurance programs); Christopher C. French, Segmented Settlements Are Not 
the Answer: A Response to Professor Squire’s Article, How Collective Settlements 
Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 589, 611–13 (2013) 
(same); Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General Principles and 
Current Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 718 (1989) (“Most major corporations purchase 
multiple layers of excess insurance to cover losses potentially aggregating in the millions of 
dollars.”). 
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procedure and defense they could conceive, keeping in mind that every 
dollar they paid to their policyholders was a dollar that could not be paid in 
profits to their shareholders.  And in cases where the policyholders 
successfully defeated the literally dozens of defenses that insurers typically 
asserted, insurers then forced their policyholders to litigate issues such as 
“trigger,” “number of occurrences,” “allocation,” and “other insurance,” in 
an attempt to avoid or minimize the amounts they were obligated to pay.161 
One case I handled regarding a long-tail product liability claim with 
over $200 million in damages, for example, involved dozens of insurers, 
took over a decade to litigate, and required two trips to the Supreme Court 
of Delaware before it was finally resolved.162  The final hold-out insurer, 
aptly named Stonewall Insurance Company, was ordered to pay almost as 
much in pre-judgment interest as the amount of its policy’s limits after its 
scorched earth defense of the case, which included more than thirty 
affirmative defenses, was litigated and finally tried more than ten years 
after the case was commenced.163 
The outcomes of such battles are very dependent upon which state’s 
laws apply and in which court the fight is litigated.164  This is not a secret.  
Consequently, as a final example of insurers’ commitment to increasing 
their profits at the expense of their policyholders, insurers have added 
choice of law and forum selection provisions to some of their policies in 
order to tilt the battle field in their favor by forcing their policyholders to 
try to collect for their losses only in the forums, and only under the laws, 
most favorable to insurers.165 
III. MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF THE PROFIT IMPERATIVE ON 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURERS AND 
POLICYHOLDERS 
How can, or should, the role the profit imperative plays in risk 
management be minimized or otherwise addressed?  The answer to that 
question is very complex and cannot be adequately covered in the context 
of a single law review article.  With that said, set forth below are a few 
 
 161.  See, e.g., French, supra note 87, at 380–85, 404 (discussing the different types of 
triggers that courts have adopted); KALIS ET. AL., supra note 81, at § 3 (discussing insurers’ 
various defenses). 
 162.  French, supra note 160, at 614–15; Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co., 996 A.2d 1254 (Del. 2010). 
 163.  Stonewall, 996 A.2d at 1256. 
 164.  KALIS ET AL., supra note 81, at §26.03. 
 165.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 469 (discussing the use of arbitration clauses, 
forum selection clauses, and choice of law clauses in commercial insurance forms). 
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ideas to begin the discussion. 
 
A. Penalties Should Be Created to Incentivize Insurers to Pay Losses 
Timely and in Full 
Under the current laws, there is no down side risk for insurers that do 
not pay their policyholders’ claims timely and in full.  To the contrary, 
unless the policyholder can prove the insurer acted in bad faith,166 which is 
quite difficult to do under most states’ laws,167 an insurer that wrongfully 
denies its policyholder’s claim, delays payment of the claim, or underpays 
the claim is only liable for the amount underpaid plus some nominal 
interest on that amount.168  Because there is no penalty for being wrong or 
 
 166.  The standards for proving bad faith vary widely in jurisdictions throughout 
America.  Some jurisdictions require that the policyholder prove that the insurer acted 
egregiously or with a dishonest intent, while others require the policyholder to prove that the 
insurer acted “unreasonably” with respect to the handling or payment of a claim and that the 
insurer knew or had reason to know that its behavior was unreasonable.  See, e.g., JERRY & 
RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 165–70 (explaining how the determination of bad faith often 
centers around the unreasonableness of the insurer’s conduct but varies across jurisdictions); 
Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 74, 96–103 (1994) (discussing what constitutes bad faith and looking at 
various standards set forth by the courts).  With respect to decisions to deny coverage, many 
courts apply a “fairly debatable” standard, which means there cannot be a finding of bad 
faith unless it is so clear that the claim is covered that it is not even fairly debatable.  See 
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 166 (discussing the “fairly debatable” standard). 
 167.  Many jurisdictions require that the insurer’s bad faith conduct be proven by the 
policyholder with “clear and convincing evidence.”  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra 
note 5, at 167 (explaining how some courts require the plaintiff to provide proof of bad faith 
by “clear and convincing evidence”).  Indeed, in most of the cases in which the policyholder 
successfully proves the insurer acted in bad faith, the insurer’s misconduct involved much 
more than, for example, the simple refusal to pay under a liability policy a reasonable 
amount within policy limits to settle a claim asserted against the policyholder.  See, e.g., 
Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (affirming a jury verdict of bad faith where 
the insurer, in addition to refusing to accept a settlement demand within policy limits, 
refused to settle even though the policyholder, a 70-year old widow, offered to contribute to 
the settlement and ultimately attempting suicide after becoming indigent while attempting to 
satisfy the judgment in excess of the policy’s limits entered against her); Birth Ctr. v. St. 
Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) (affirming a jury verdict of bad faith in a medical 
malpractice case involving an injured baby where the insurer refused to settle within policy 
limits due to its corporate practice of trying, instead of settling, all “bad baby cases,” despite 
the insurer-appointed defense counsel recommending settlement and the presiding trial 
judge informing the insurer that it was acting in bad faith by refusing to settle). 
 168.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 161 (explaining that bad faith 
remedies were created due to the “apparent inadequacy of contract remedies to compensate 
insureds and deter insurers from elevating their own interests above their insureds.’”).  In 
order to actually be awarded a penalty such as punitive damages, however, in many 
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treating their policyholders poorly, insurers currently have little incentive 
to pay claims timely or in full.  To the contrary, the profit imperative 
actually dictates that insurers delay claims payments as long as possible to 
take advantage of the “float,” pay as little as possible for even legitimate 
claims, and contest the payment of claims so long as the costs of doing so 
are lower than the payment amounts being sought and there is not a 
significant chance of being held liable for acting in bad faith.169  And, as 
discussed above in Part II.C, this is exactly what insurers do. 
To change the risk/benefit equation for insurers regarding the payment 
of claims, penalties need to be created to incentivize insurers to pay timely 
and in full.  There are so many ways in which to do so that it could and 
should be the subject of a separate article.  However, here is one idea:  a 
law should be created to the effect that if the fact finder determines that the 
value of a claim is greater than the amount paid or offered by the insurer, 
then the insurer would be liable not only for the difference, but also for a 
penalty, interest above market rates, and attorneys’ fees.170  For example, if 
a loss is determined to be worth $1000 but the insurer only paid or offered 
to pay $700, then the insurer would be liable for:  (1) the additional $300 
owed, (2) a 20% penalty on the unpaid $300,171 (3) interest on the unpaid 
$300 calculated at the prime rate plus 5% from the date of the loss until the 
date of final payment, and (4) the policyholder’s attorneys’ fees.  The 
prospect of being held liable for amounts significantly greater than their 
existing contractual obligations in the absence of a finding of bad faith 
should discourage insurers from:  (1) collecting “float” income by delaying 
the payment of claims and (2) forcing their policyholders to sue in order to 
recover the full value of their losses. 
 
jurisdictions the policyholder must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer 
engaged in egregious, wanton misconduct.  Id. at 167, 169. 
 169.  See supra Part II.C. (explaining why insurers delay payments as long as possible). 
 170.  I am not the only person to suggest that insurers should be penalized for failing to 
pay the full value of claims timely.  See, e.g., 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND 
DISPUTES § 9:24 (6th ed. 2012) (“There are, in short, sound public policy reasons for 
allowing an insured some type of ‘extra’ award when an insurance company unreasonably 
refuses to . . . indemnify the insured, forcing him or her to go to the expense of establishing 
the company’s error by means of litigation . . . .  The most appropriate relief, therefore, 
when an insurance company has acted unreasonably, is an award of attorney’s fees.”).  
Indeed, some states have enacted statutes that impose penalties on insurers that fail to pay 
their policyholders’ claims timely and in full under certain lines of insurance.  See, e.g., 
RUSS & SEGULLA, supra note 96, at § 207:75 (citing Minnesota, Georgia, and Louisiana 
cases and statutes). 
 171.  Although I am proposing a 20% penalty in this Article as an illustration of how a 
penalty system would work, it is notable that 20% is the penalty the United States imposes 
on people who substantially underpay their taxes over the course of a tax year.  26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6662.  If there is a gross underpayment, then the penalty is 40%.  Id. 
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B. Certain Exclusions Should Be Eliminated from Policies and Insurers’ 
Ability to Refuse to Insure Certain Entities and People Should Be 
Reduced 
The hollowing out of coverage provided under socially critical lines of 
insurance, such as property insurance through the addition of exclusions for 
catastrophic and other risks that interfere with insurers’ fulfillment of the 
profit imperative that has occurred over the past 40 years also should be 
reversed.  For example, homeowners policies, which are a social necessity 
today, should be required to cover losses caused by floods and hurricanes.  
The losses caused by these types of disasters are exactly the types of losses 
that should be covered under such policies.  Removing coverage for the 
very types of losses that are most common and have the most devastating 
impact on people, businesses, and communities is antithetical to the risk 
transferring purpose of insurance.172  Insurers simply should not be allowed 
to avoid fulfilling the purpose of insurance solely in the name of profits. 
Thus, each of the numerous lines of insurance that currently exist 
should be analyzed by state insurance commissioners to determine how 
critical the line is to society.  To that end, a task force could be created by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners with representatives 
from the insurance industry, legislatures, and consumer advocates to 
examine the various lines of insurance.  If a line of insurance is determined 
to be a socially critical line of insurance, then insurers’ use of exclusions to 
hollow out the coverage actually being provided should be closely 
examined and each exclusion should be eliminated or narrowed as 
appropriate. 
Similarly, insurers’ ability to refuse to insure people or entities that 
they have concluded are not adequately profitable because they are “bad 
risks” also should be reduced or eliminated for socially critical lines of 
insurance.  In the absence of such controls on insurers, reverse adverse 
selection has been employed by insurers such that only the most profitable 
people and businesses can purchase insurance under many important lines 
of insurance while the least profitable or unprofitable have been left 
uninsured.173  These uninsured people and businesses are often the ones 
 
 172.  See supra Part I (explaining the dangers of excluding crucial risks). 
 173.  Simply stated, adverse selection is “the disproportionate tendency of those who are 
more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.”  Kenneth S. Abraham & 
Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New 
Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993); see 
also Baker, supra note 11, at 373, 375 (discussing how adverse selection results in high risk 
individuals being disproportionately represented in insurance pools).  Some critics of the 
concept of adverse selection have argued that insurers’ alleged concerns regarding the 
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who need insurance the most.  There is no tenable defense for such a result.  
Consequently, the restrictions placed on insurers’ ability to refuse to insure 
certain people or businesses should be expanded beyond the few limitations 
that currently exist for each line of insurance determined to be socially 
critical. 
Although not being done in a coordinated or comprehensive way, in 
recent years we have begun to see some legislatures moving in the 
direction of this proposal.  For example, with respect to health insurance, 
the Affordable Care Act has:  (1) removed insurers’ ability to refuse to 
insure certain people, (2) removed insurers’ ability to cancel insurance for 
people who become sick and (3) reduced insurers’ ability to use reverse 
adverse selection to charge certain risk classifications prohibitively 
expensive premiums.174  Similarly, in a more limited way, it also has 
happened for auto insurance in the sense that even drivers who private 
 
impact that adverse selection has on policyholders’ behavior are overblown.  See, e.g., Peter 
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 
1223, 1225 (2004) (arguing that while adverse selection in insurance markets is a 
possibility, it is not as serious of a problem as some people suggest).  The role adverse 
selection has on insurers’ behavior, however, is quite significant.  Insurers use adverse 
selection—or more accurately, reverse adverse selection—to improve their profit margins.  
Insurers use decades’ worth of claims data related to each line of insurance collected by the 
entire insurance industry through ISO, detailed information regarding each prospective 
policyholder that is collected through property reviews and applications for insurance, and 
actuaries to create a risk profile for each prospective insured.  See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra 
note 6, at 14 (explaining how insurers use claims data); Siegelman, supra, at 1245, 1248–49, 
1251–52, 1263 (discussing the sources of informational asymmetry between insurers and 
insureds); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 10, at 206, 209–11 (examining how insurers 
gain information during the underwriting process and insurers’ informational advantages); 
Baker, supra note 11, at 381 (describing an alternative approach where risk-based pricing 
and underwriting would be  limited or prohibited and the purchase of insurance would not 
be required).  Then, subject to some limited laws regarding discrimination based upon 
protected categories, such as race, gender and genetics, insurers decide whether to insure the 
person or business at all and if so, what premium to charge.  See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, 
supra note 10, at 204, 206 (discussing how insurers can adjust premiums based on 
individual policyholder’s characteristics, ongoing behavior, and loss experience); 
ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 144–156 (discussing the various laws that prevent certain 
types of discrimination in establishing rates or insuring people); Baker, supra note 11, at 
377–79, 392 (discussing discrimination against battered women in the late 1980s and noting 
that although risk classification is one of the most powerful competitive tools, it can create 
reverse adverse selection).  Indeed, if not for laws prohibiting it, insurers would, for 
example, refuse to sell life, health and disability insurance to battered women because they 
are more likely to suffer injuries and thus, are viewed as unprofitable, bad risks.  Id. at 393.  
Insurers also would use genetic profiling to avoid insuring certain people if it were not 
prohibited.  Id. at 394, n.53. 
 174.  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARZ, ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE LAW & 
REGULATION, HEALTH CARE SUPPLEMENT, at 20 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining the effect of the 
Affordable Care Act on insurers). 
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insurers refuse to insure because insurers do not consider them adequately 
profitable generally can still get a minimum amount of liability coverage 
through state residual risk insurance pools.175 
C. State Sponsored Insurance Programs Could Be Created for Socially 
Critical Lines of Insurance that Private Insurers Refuse to Sell 
If the proposals set forth in Parts III.A and III.B were implemented, 
would private insurers still sell the impacted lines of insurance?  Maybe 
not.  So what then?  As discussed below, that may not be a bad result 
because state sponsored insurance programs could be created to fill the 
voids and state sponsored insurance programs can fulfill the purpose of 
insurance in ways that private insurers currently do not due to the profit 
imperative, the nature of the risks involved and the current laws. 
1. Mutual Insurance Companies Are Not the Solution Even Though 
They Theoretically Could Be Able to Fulfill the Purpose of 
Insurance for Some Lines of Coverage 
If the profit imperative is the primary source of conflict in risk 
management today, is the solution to the profits over purpose conflict 
simply to restrict the sale of insurance to only non-profit mutual 
companies?  Unfortunately, no. 
Although the profit imperative does not impede mutual insurance 
companies in the way that it does publicly traded stock companies, mutual 
companies are hamstrung by their inability to raise capital quickly and to 
accumulate it.176  Consequently, although it might be possible over a very 
long period of time to accumulate the capital necessary to insure 
 
 175.  See ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 771–73.  There are numerous additional 
examples of legislatures enacting statutes to override policy exclusions.  One example is that 
most states have passed statutes that nullify the innocent co-insured exclusion insurers 
added to property policies in an attempt to prevent innocent co-insureds from recovering 
under policies for losses that were expected or intended by another insured.  See, e.g.,  
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 425–26 (noting that five states have adopted The 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ model statute regarding innocent co-
insureds and at least 36 other states have their own statutes).  Another example is the State 
of California’s refusal to enforce exclusions that would exclude coverage for a loss that is 
concurrently caused by both an excluded peril and a covered peril where the efficient 
proximate cause of the loss is a covered peril.  See West’s Ann. Cal. Ins. Code § 530 (not 
allowing anti-concurrent causation exclusions to remove coverage where the efficient 
proximate cause of a loss is covered); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d 
704 (Cal. 1989) (holding that the facts at issue required the jury to conduct an efficient 
proximate cause analysis to determine liability). 
 176.  Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 216–17. 
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catastrophic risks such as floods, earthquakes and hurricanes, it would be 
difficult for most mutual companies to earn and retain the necessary capital 
needed to insure such risks.  That inability to quickly and easily raise 
capital was one of the primary drivers of the shift from mutual insurance 
companies to publicly traded stock insurance companies.177 
In addition, many members (i.e., policyholders) of mutual companies 
who are not likely to suffer a catastrophic loss prefer premium reductions 
or dividends if the company has surplus capital so even mutual companies 
have pressures that impede their ability to accumulate the large amounts of 
capital needed to cover catastrophic losses.178  Thus, although the mutual 
company form theoretically may be fine for some lines of insurance such as 
automobile and life insurance, which have high frequency but low loss 
values and thus do not need large capital reserves to pay claims, mutual 
companies are not a good vehicle through which to insure catastrophic risks 
despite the availability of catastrophe bonds and reinsurance for some 
portions of their risk portfolios.179 
Putting aside the issue of adequate capitalization, however, why would 
mutual companies be the answer to the conflict between the profit 
imperative and the purpose of insurance in risk management for any lines 
of insurance in light of the fact that mutual companies currently behave 
quite similarly to publicly traded stock companies with respect to the 
payment of claims and the use of exclusions and adverse selection to avoid 
covering certain risks and people?180  One possible answer is that, in order 
to compete with publicly traded stock companies, mutual companies have 
been forced to behave like publicly traded stock companies.  Thus, if 
mutual companies did not have to compete with publicly traded stock 
companies, then mutual companies theoretically could return to their 
original purpose of serving as a social safety net by acting as an 
intermediary on behalf of a group of businesses or people by creating and 
managing a pool of money created by the group in order to pay the losses 
of the unfortunate few. 
 
 177.  See supra Part I.B. (explaining the rise of publically traded stock insurance 
companies). 
 178.  Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 214. 
 179.  There is some uncertainty as to whether the reinsurance market has the capacity to 
completely reinsure the amounts necessary to ensure proper capitalization for some 
catastrophic risks.  See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 217, 223 (discussing the 
uncertain capacity of the reinsurance market and three states’ approaches to help remedy the 
problem). 
 180.  See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 64, 97, 106–09, 138–40, 145, 158, 163 
(describing the claims payment practices of State Farm, a mutual insurance company and 
one of the largest insurers in America, and concluding that it does not act “like a good 
neighbor”). 
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As things currently stand, however, in order to compete with publicly 
traded stock companies for business, mutual insurance companies must 
spend enormous sums on advertising just like publicly traded stock 
companies do.  They also must charge competitive premium rates because 
that is the only means by which consumers currently can compare insurers.  
Purchasers of insurance today cannot effectively compare insurers on 
anything other than premium rates due to:  (1) the proliferation of ISO’s 
standardized insurance policy forms which both mutual companies and 
publicly traded stock companies use181 and (2) insurers’ effective 
concealment of their claims payment practices because the insurance 
industry’s powerful lobbyists thus far have convinced state insurance 
commissioners not to make such information publicly available based upon 
the argument that such information is confidential, propriety business 
information.182  As discussed above in Part II.C, premiums are based 
primarily upon the projected claims payments because the amounts paid on 
claims are by far insurers’ greatest expenses.  Consequently, in order to 
compete with for-profit insurance companies, mutual insurance companies 
have been forced to adopt similar claims payment practices in order to keep 
their costs down to allow them to charge competitive premium rates.  In the 
words of one mutual company’s Vice President of Claims, “if our 
competition settles claims for less money than we do, we stand a good 
chance of being non-competitive . . . .”183  The same competitive premium 
rate pressures also force mutual companies to refuse to insure high-risk 
people because the overall premium rates for the entire risk pool would go 
up if they did. 
In short, competition with publicly traded stock companies has forced 
mutual companies to behave like publicly traded stock companies in a race 
to the bottom with respect to the amounts paid for claims and the 
availability of coverage for higher risk people and certain perils.  If mutual 
companies did not have to compete with publicly traded stock companies 
for customers and individual insurers’ claims payment practices were 
disclosed to the public, then one would expect that mutual companies could 
and would change their practices such that they could be part of the answer 
 
 181.  See supra note 46, and accompanying text. 
 182.  See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 38–40 (discussing how insurance companies 
closely guard data on lawsuits for unfair claims practices); Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently 
Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 394, 415–20 (2014) (discussing the need for the disclosure of insurers’ 
claims payment practices in order to allow consumers to make more informed insurance 
purchasing decisions). 
 183.  G. Robert Mecherle, Vice President of Claims, State Farm, Remarks at the State 
Farm Divisional Claim Superintendents Conference (1986), quoted in FEINMAN, supra note 
6, at 64. 
ARTICLE 1 (FRENCH).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:40 PM 
2015] THE ROLE OF THE PROFIT IMPERATIVE IN RISK MANAGEMENT 1127 
 
to the profits over purpose problem at least with respect to some lines of 
insurance. 
2. Correlated Risk Concerns and the Profit Imperative Result in 
Insurers Taking a Narrow View of the Relevant Time Horizon 
and Geographic Area in Which to Measure the Profitability of 
Insuring Certain Risks 
It should not be unexpected that insurers may refuse to sell insurance 
that is required to cover all types of catastrophes, including floods, 
earthquakes and hurricanes, because insurers contend such catastrophic 
risks cannot be insured profitably because they are highly correlated risks 
that occur in geographically localized areas.184  Thus, insurers contend that 
they are unable to adequately spread the risk of loss across enough 
policyholders because most or all of the policyholders in an affected area 
suffer similar losses at the same time and, due to adverse selection, people 
or businesses that are not located in areas prone to such risks will not 
purchase insurance so there are not enough “fortunate” policyholders that 
pay premiums to cover the losses of the “unfortunate” policyholders.185 
In using this justification, however, insurers largely must ignore the 
fact that they now have much larger geographic footprints than they did 
decades ago and they have reinsurance to cover a portion or all of the 
losses of their entire portfolios of business (i.e., all of the losses of their 
policyholders in the impacted area as well as non-impacted areas).  The 
reinsurance market today is dominated by companies that insure other 
insurers on a global basis, which means the localized risk of a flood 
impacting an underlying insurer in one area of the world is actually spread 
across people and businesses throughout the entire world.186  Insurers today 
also can further spread the risk of loss through the sale of catastrophe 
bonds.  Thus, unlike years ago when insurers’ businesses were much more 
localized, the correlated risk of loss in a local area today is in many 
respects overstated because the “fortunate” majority of policyholders that 
pay premiums to cover the losses of the “unfortunate” few policyholders 
are actually spread across the entire world.187  Nonetheless, because 
reinsurance and catastrophe bonds may not be viewed by insurers as a 
 
 184.  See Cummins, supra note 4, at 343 (discussing how risks that are locally dependent 
may be globally independent). 
 185.  See, e.g., Cummins, supra note 4, at 342–43 (describing an insurance statistical 
model and its relation to the law of large numbers); Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 187 
(discussing the role of reinsurance in funding insurance losses for catastrophes). 
 186.  Cummins, supra note 4, at 343. 
 187.  Id. 
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complete answer to the correlated risk problem (e.g., reinsurers may refuse 
to cover insurers that insure catastrophic risks or markets for catastrophe 
bonds may be weak in years following catastrophes), insurers may refuse to 
sell insurance if they are not allowed to exclude coverage for catastrophic 
risks. 
Even if the correlated risk problem did not dissuade insurers from 
selling insurance that is required to cover catastrophic risks, insurers still 
may decline to sell such insurance because their shareholders demand 
profitability in both the short-term and long-term.  Paying losses caused by 
catastrophes results in uneven earnings for insurers.  Thus, profitability 
cannot be ensured in the short-term and, instead, it is likely there will be 
periods of unprofitability.188 
Yet, the fact that catastrophes may result in periods of short-term 
unprofitability does not necessarily mean that catastrophic risks cannot or 
should not be insured.  To determine the financial feasibility of insuring 
catastrophes, one should not consider the profitability of such lines of 
insurance during just the narrow time period immediately following a 
catastrophe.189  Hurricanes, for example, happen infrequently in the same 
exact geographic location.  Indeed, despite the fact that hurricanes are 
coming ashore somewhere every year, insurers have been collecting 
insurance premiums from people and businesses that are located in the 
afflicted areas for many years, if not decades, before a hurricane hits the 
area.  Insurers collected thirty-six years of premiums from New Orleans 
residents between Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Katrina.190  
Consequently, in measuring the financial viability of property insurance 
that covers hurricanes, instead of considering the profitability of the 
insurance during just the time period immediately following the date when 
a hurricane hits, one should consider the profits and losses of the line of 
insurance over the course of the many decades in which insurers received 
premiums and investment income from those premiums before and after 
 
 188.  Indeed, undercapitalized insurers that cover catastrophic losses can suffer such 
devastating losses in the short-term that they can become insolvent.  For example, several 
undercapitalized insurers became insolvent following Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  Cole et 
al., supra note 119, at 266. 
 189.  See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 206, 208 (discussing how dynamic 
premium strategies based on only a few years of experience will lead to highly variable loss 
ratios in some years in the context of insuring catastrophes). 
 190.  Insurers’ claims regarding the alleged lack of profitability of insuring catastrophes 
are demonstrably overstated.  Even in 2005, the year of Hurricane Katrina, property/casualty 
insurance companies had record profits of $48.8 billion and $68.1 billion the following year.  
See FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 149 (citing Testimony of J. Robert Hunter before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate, p. 11 
(April 11, 2007)). 
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the hurricane hit.  If one did so, one just might find that selling property 
insurance in New Orleans during the past fifty years actually was 
profitable. 
Nonetheless, the profit imperative and shareholder pressures 
discourage private insurers from covering catastrophic risks for the reasons 
discussed above.  Consequently, it should be expected that insurers may 
decline to sell insurance that is required to cover catastrophes. 
3. The Current Laws Create Financial Disincentives for Private 
Insurers to Fulfill the Purpose of Insurance that Would Not 
Apply to State Sponsored Insurance Programs 
In addition to shareholders’ myopic focus on profitability in the short-
term and the correlated risk problem associated with catastrophes, it is 
difficult for many insurers to accumulate and maintain the capital necessary 
to handle large-scale catastrophes under the current laws.  First, the current 
tax laws effectively discourage insurers from accumulating capital to pay 
future losses.  The income generated by insurers that could be set aside to 
pay future losses is taxed.191  Then, if that income is not paid to 
shareholders in the form of dividends, the income generated by the money 
set aside for future unrealized losses is taxed as well.192  Second, companies 
that have accumulated surplus capital, which is what insurance companies 
need to do in order to cover the losses associated with catastrophes, become 
takeover targets for corporate raiders that think the capital has a better use 
than simply sitting there unused while being taxed.193  Third, the accounting 
rules do not allow insurers to set aside reserves for the payment of future 
claims if the losses giving rise to the claims have not yet occurred.194  
Consequently, the cumulative result of these laws is that the surplus 
earnings of insurers are paid to shareholders as dividends or to managers as 
bonuses, so the companies may not have adequate surplus capital to cover 
catastrophic losses, which is another reason it should be expected that 
insurers may decline to sell insurance that is required to cover 
 
 191.  See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 212, 222 (explaining why insurance 
companies are not incentivized to accumulate funds for catastrophes); Cummins, supra note 
4, at 371. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 212–13 (discussing how other 
companies can purchase a cash rich insurance company, use the cash reserve and then shut 
down the insurance company). 
 194.  See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 209, 222 (discussing Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 5 Accounting for Contingencies, which 
precludes an insurance company from earmarking capital surplus to pay for future 
catastrophic losses that have not yet occurred); Cummins, supra note 4, at 371–72. 
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catastrophes.195 
If private insurers were to refuse to sell socially critical lines of 
insurance in a legal regime in which:  (1) the insurance sold was required to 
cover catastrophic risks, (2) insurers could not refuse to insure people or 
businesses that are able to pay premiums, and (3) insurers would be subject 
to penalties for failing to pay the full value of losses timely, then state 
sponsored insurance programs may need to be created to fill the voids.  
Instead of being a negative outcome, however, this might actually be a 
good result because state sponsored insurance programs could be a better 
vehicle for providing insurance for some lines of insurance than mutual or 
stock companies. 
For example, state sponsored insurance programs would be good for 
insuring catastrophic risks.  Because premium income would not be paid to 
shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases, state sponsored 
insurance programs could accumulate the capital needed to pay large 
catastrophic losses caused by disasters such as floods, hurricanes and 
earthquakes.  And, the accumulation of capital would not make state 
sponsored insurance programs takeover targets because such programs 
would not, of course, be available for purchase by corporate raiders.  
Further, state sponsored insurance programs also would not be subject to 
the tax and accounting rules that discourage publicly traded stock 
companies and mutual companies from accumulating capital.  Thus, state 
sponsored insurance programs would not be subject to many of the legal 
impediments that private insurers currently must overcome in order to 
cover catastrophic risks. 
4. State Sponsored Insurance Programs Could Reduce Moral 
Hazard and Adverse Selection Concerns 
State sponsored insurance programs also can address adverse selection 
and moral hazard196 concerns more efficiently than private insurers can.  
 
 195.  Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 212. 
 196.  The concept of moral hazard captures the intuitive idea that a policyholder will 
have a “tendency to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance.”  Adam F. Scales, 
The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94 VA. L. REV. 
1259, 1263 (2008) (book review) (reviewing and citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE 
LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 45–
48 (2008)).  Judge Easterbrook has described the theory underlying the concept by stating 
that “once a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he bears less 
of the cost of his conduct.”  W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th 
Cir. 1985).  The term “moral hazard” also generally encompasses situations where “[a] 
person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an 
insurer.”  DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 480 (8th ed. 
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For example, states have the power and incentive to make insurance 
mandatory to ensure satisfactory participation rates.  Thus, to the extent 
adverse selection is a concern, by making the insurance mandatory, that 
concern could be eliminated.197  The Affordable Care Act is an example of 
this.198 
Similarly, state sponsored insurance programs should have more 
power and ability to regulate policyholders’ behavior than private insurers 
do.  Thus, states could either mandate or reward policyholders to take 
specified loss-prevention activities.199  An example of this on the federal 
level is the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, which 
incentivizes policyholders who are covered under the NFIP program to 
rebuild their homes above flood heights by charging them significantly 
lower premiums if they do so.200  Although private insurers can regulate 
policyholders’ behavior in some ways,201 one advantage state sponsored 
insurance programs have over private insurers on this point is that future 
owners of the property also would benefit from premium reductions for 
preventative measures taken by prior owners.  Unless the subsequent owner 
purchases insurance from the same insurer as the previous owner, that may 
or may not be true because private insurers do not have uniform premium 
 
2005).  Numerous scholars have written articles regarding moral hazard and offered similar 
descriptions of the concept.  See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort 
Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’ is 
sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard’, the former referring to deliberate acts like 
arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of carefulness.”) (citing 
C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 217 
(4th ed. 1981); Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in 
LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, 42, 47 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 
1988) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence and characteristics of insurance 
coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’ loss prevention activities, including 
carelessness and fraud . . . .”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 12 (“The existence of 
insurance could have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of loss . . . . This 
phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and 
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Moral hazard refers to the effect of the 
existence of insurance itself on the level of insurance claims made by the insured . . . Ex 
ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss, 
because of the existence of insurance.”). 
 197.  Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 211, 217. 
 198.  See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ supra note 174 (explaining the effect of the 
Affordable Care Act on insurers). 
 199.  Id.; Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 217. 
 200.  42 U.S.C.A. § 4015; See also National Flood Insurance Program, Can We Afford to 
Rebuild Higher? Can We Afford Not To?, FEMA, available at http://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/20130726-1910-25045-7987/fema_datasheet_rebuild_aezone05.pdf (explaining 
the link between National Flood Insurance Program premiums and flood risk). 
 201.  See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 10 (explaining the ways insurers can regulate 
and shape the behavior of their policyholders). 
ARTICLE 1 (FRENCH).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:40 PM 
1132 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
guidelines so the premium discounts that one insurer provides may not be 
provided by another.202 
In short, state sponsored insurance plans can address moral hazard and 
adverse selection concerns in ways that private insurers cannot. 
5. State Sponsored Insurance Programs Should Have Lower 
Premiums 
Another advantage that should result from the creation of state 
sponsored insurance programs is lower premiums.  Because private 
insurers compete for business, a significant portion of the premiums 
collected by both publicly traded stock companies and mutual companies 
goes to sales commissions for insurance agents.203  Indeed, it has been 
reported that insurers currently pay as much as 20% of the premiums they 
collect in sales commissions.204 
Insurers also currently spend significant amounts of the premiums 
they collect on advertising.205  Who has not seen the TV commercials that 
run over and over again in high priced ad slots during prime time in which 
GEICO claims that “spending 15 minutes could save you 15% or more on 
car insurance” or Progressive’s ads intended to help policyholders save on 
premiums by avoiding “rate suckers” (depicted by people jumping on 
vehicles and sucking on them) or Flo, the bubbly Progressive salesperson, 
exhorting customers to try a “snapshot” or to save money by “bundling”?  
In fact, the fifty largest insurers spend approximately $2.5 billion a year on 
advertising.206 
Once a person has been induced to apply for insurance due to ads and 
insurance salesmen plying for the person’s business, insurers then spend 
significant amounts of money in the underwriting process in an attempt to 
weed out the “bad risks” (i.e., the people most likely to have claims).207  If 
insurance were mandatory and it were sold by state sponsored programs, 
then very little money would need to be spent on underwriting efforts 
designed to avoid selling insurance to bad risks because the bad risks 
would be included in the insurance pool. 
State sponsored insurance programs also should result in lower 
 
 202.  Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, The Benefits of Introducing a Mandatory State 
Hurricane Insurance Scheme in Florida 14 (HEC Working Papers in Economics, 2009). 
 203.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 10. Cole et al., supra note 119, at 271. 
 204.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 10. 
 205.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 11, 17; Cole et al., supra note 119, at 271. 
 206.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 54. 
 207.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 13, 17; Cole et al., supra note 119, at 271; 
Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 211, 217. 
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premiums because they would not need to spend as much money 
investigating and litigating their policyholders’ claims in order to maximize 
profits for shareholders.  Insurers spend approximately 12% of the 
premiums they collect investigating, contesting and litigating claims.208  
Fighting claims makes good business sense for publicly traded stock 
insurance companies because every dollar insurers can avoid paying on 
claims increases insurers’ profitability.209  That would not be the case for 
state sponsored insurance programs because they would not be governed by 
the profit imperative and instead would only need to verify the validity of a 
claim before paying it. 
In sum, if insurance were sold by state sponsored programs, then all of 
the money private insurers currently spend on sales commissions, high 
priced ads, underwriting and aggressive claims handling would be 
unnecessary.  Those savings could be directly passed on to policyholders in 
the form of lower premiums. 
6. European State Sponsored Insurance Programs as Models for 
America 
Although unlikely to be a source of inspiration in light of Europe’s 
current economic climate in which many countries in Europe are still in a 
recession and several European countries’ financial solvency remains in 
question, in order to understand what a successful state sponsored 
insurance program would look like, one can look to Europe.  Switzerland, 
Spain, France and Germany are examples of countries that successfully 
have implemented state sponsored insurance programs.210 
For example, Spain has a state sponsored insurance program known as 
“the Consorcio.”211  The Consorcio insures all properties in Spain against a 
wide range of catastrophes.212  The Consorcio covers both natural 
catastrophes and unnatural catastrophes such as terrorist attacks.213  The 
insurance is mandatory and the policy issued is standardized.214  The total 
administrative costs of the program for sales, underwriting and claims 
 
 208.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 11. 
 209.  See FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 2, 5.  Insurers’ aggressive claims investigation and 
payment practices do not hurt their bottom lines in the form of lost customers caused by 
gaining a reputation for unfair claims payment practices because the information regarding 
insurers claims payment practices is not disclosed to the public.  Id. at 7, 39–40. 
 210.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 4. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
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administration are only 10% of the premiums collected.215 
Under European state sponsored insurance programs, the policyholder 
and insurer are not adversaries when it comes to the payment of claims 
because the insurer does not have shareholders pushing for increased 
dividend distributions which can be achieved only if the insurer nickels and 
dimes its policyholders when it comes to paying claims.  Consequently, 
empirical studies have shown that European citizens have a high degree of 
customer satisfaction regarding the amount and timeliness of the payment 
of their claims.216 
In contrast, in the United States, policyholders and their insurers spend 
millions of dollars engaged in endless litigation whenever catastrophes hit.  
For example, whenever a hurricane comes ashore and brings flooding with 
it, litigation ensues regarding whether the damage to homes was caused by 
flooding (an excluded peril) versus wind (a covered peril).217  More than 
6,600 lawsuits were filed in federal court in New Orleans in connection 
with Hurricane Katrina.218  In Mississippi, one insurer involved in the 
Hurricane Katrina litigation filed a motion to transfer the lawsuits out of 
Mississippi on the basis of a survey that showed that 49% of the people in 
southern Mississippi “believe that insurance executives are on the same 
level as child molesters.”219  The Louisiana Department of Insurance 
received 20,000 complaints per month during the six-month period 
following the storm.220  Thus, it is an understatement to say there is a high 
degree of dissatisfaction with insurers’ handling and payment of claims in 
 
 215.  Id. at 4, 10, 11. 
 216.  Id. at 13. 
 217.  Id. at 14; French, supra note 97, at 243 (discussing the “ensuing loss” clause’s 
potential impact on wind versus water disputes for hurricane claims); Erik S. Knutsen, 
Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 957, 959–60 (2010) (discussing concurrent causation with respect to, among other 
issues, wind versus water damage caused by hurricanes).  See also Leonard v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing an anti-concurrent causation 
exclusion in a wind versus water dispute following Hurricane Katrina); Corban v. United 
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601, 617–18 (Miss. 2009) (same).  Notably, because private 
insurers handle claims under the National Flood Insurance Program on behalf of the federal 
government, many insurers that issued homeowners policies were responsible for estimating 
the repair costs for both the federal flood policies under the NFIP program and the insurers’ 
homeowners policies.  When estimating the cost to remove and replace drywall, for 
example, the profit imperative drove one insurer to calculate the cost at $0.76 per square 
foot when the costs would be charged to its homeowners policy and $3.31 per square foot 
when it would be charged to the federal flood program.  See FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 165 
(describing risk aversion in insurance). 
 218.  FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 147. 
 219.  Id. at 145 (quoting Benick, The Flood After the Storm: The Hurricane Katrina 
Homeowners’ Insurance Litigation, 4 BUS. L. BRIEF (Am. U.) 51 (Fall 2007)). 
 220.  Id. at 147. 
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the United States.221  If American state sponsored insurance programs could 
duplicate the success of European state sponsored programs with respect to 
the handling and payment of claims, then policyholders in America would 
have a much higher satisfaction rate than they currently do with respect to 
the payment of losses. 
D. Impediments to the Reforms Necessary to Address the Conflict 
between the Profit Imperative and the Purpose of Insurance in Risk 
Management 
The impediments to the implementation of the reforms to insurance 
law discussed in this Article are considerable.  First, imposing penalties on 
an insurer that breaches its contract of insurance by failing to pay the full 
amount of a policyholder’s loss in a timely manner without a finding that 
the insurer acted in bad faith is simply inconsistent with existing law 
regarding damages for breach of contract, which generally does not provide 
for an award of penalties or extra contractual damages.222  Thus, in order 
for legislatures to embrace this extra-contractual damage award, there 
would need to be a broader recognition that insurance policies are not 
simply contracts, but rather, they occupy a role of great social importance 
as social safety nets and they are not actually “negotiated” contracts by two 
parties to accommodate the desires of the parties regarding the transfer of 
risk.223  Until that happens, it will be difficult to convince legislatures to 
create disincentives for insurers to pursue the fulfillment of the profit 
imperative by paying as little as possible on their policyholders’ losses as 
late as possible. 
Second, because it is widely believed that the losses caused by 
catastrophes are correlated risks that cannot be insured profitably,224 it will 
be difficult to overcome the powerful insurance industry lobbyists’ 
 
 221.  Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 14. Although insurers collect and report 
information regarding the complaints they receive with respect to their claims handling 
practices to state insurance commissioners, the full extent of consumer dissatisfaction with 
insurers’ claims handling practices is unknown because insurers refuse to disclose such 
information, and thus far, they have convinced state insurance commissioners not to disclose 
such information either.  See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 216–17; Schwarcz, supra note 
182, at 415–420 (discussing the need for transparency in claims handling practices). 
 222.  See, e.g., Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 N.W. 189, 191 (1921) 
(“the general rule [is] that the measure of damages for breach of a contract for the payment 
of money is the amount agreed to be paid with interest”); Restatement (Second), Contracts, 
§§346-56 (1979) (addressing the various damages available for breach of contract, which do 
not include penalties). 
 223.  See supra Part I (highlighting the social importance of insurance). 
 224.  See supra Parts II.B.1 and III.C.2 (explaining the belief of insurers that insuring 
catastrophic events is not profitable). 
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opposition to the elimination of exclusions for such risks.  Similarly, 
insurers likely will cite freedom of contract and the purported 
unprofitability of insuring certain risks to support the continued use of 
exclusions for other non-catastrophic risks of loss such as environmental 
damages and asbestos liabilities.  Insurance regulators generally have 
accepted such arguments in the past, as evidenced by the fact that the ISO 
policy forms that contain such exclusions have been widely approved.225 
Third, the creation of state sponsored insurance programs in America 
for socially critical lines of insurance likely would face immense political 
opposition in many states.  Many Americans highly value freedom of 
choice and capitalism, and if people think they will be left with only state 
sponsored insurance programs if the laws were changed along the lines 
discussed in this Article, then such a regime likely would face significant 
opposition.  Indeed, look at what has happened with the Affordable Care 
Act.  It was passed only when Congress was heavily Democratic and has 
been subjected to dozens of efforts to repeal it since Republicans obtained a 
majority in the House of Representatives.  If something as important as 
ensuring that sick people are able to obtain health care in this country has 
been met with so much political resistance, then there is little reason for 
optimism that the political will exists at this juncture for legislation to be 
passed that might result in private insurers leaving certain insurance 
markets. 
Fourth, another major objection to state sponsored insurance programs 
is that capitalism generally allocates resources in the most efficient manner 
through competition and incentives to eliminate waste.  Indeed, to prove 
why governments should not be selling insurance in the United States, one 
only needs to consider the National Flood Insurance Program.  The NFIP 
has been a poster-child example of why government should not be in the 
business of insurance.  The NFIP historically used outdated floodplain 
maps due to a lack of funds needed to create accurate ones so in many 
instances the wrong homes were insured or uninsured.226  The NFIP also 
has been actuarially unsound, which has led to frequent periods of 
insolvency.227  In addition, because the program is voluntary, participation 
has been poor, and it also has been noted that many homes covered under 
the program get flooded repeatedly and the homeowners do not take steps 
to prevent flood damage.228  Consequently, if insurance were only about the 
 
 225.  See supra Part II (highlighting the freedom of contract argument frequently made 
by insurers). 
 226.  See supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes (highlighting problems with the 
government acting as an insurer). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
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most efficient allocation of resources and administration of a profitable 
business, then the case for private insurers selling insurance instead of 
governments could be made simply by saying “NFIP.” 
Perhaps, with the changes to the NFIP made by the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Reform Act of 2012 that were designed to address such problems, in 
time the NFIP will be a model government insurance program instead of a 
justification for private insurance.  For now, however, its past failures 
decrease the chances that state sponsored insurance programs on a national 
scale will be embraced.229  Thus, because America’s history with 
government sponsored insurance programs generally has been poor, one 
should not expect that state sponsored insurance programs would be 
warmly embraced despite the benefits of such programs and the numerous 
shortcomings of private insurance that are discussed in this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
The profit imperative has undermined the role of insurance in risk 
management in recent years.  Insurance originally was intended to serve as 
a social safety net to ensure that people who cannot afford to bear the 
financial risk of disasters could transfer and spread that risk across a 
community of people or businesses in exchange for the payment of a 
certain loss, a premium.  That purpose cannot be fulfilled when the goal of 
insurers—entities that originally in America were only administrators of 
the pools of premium money created by policyholders for the benefit of the 
unfortunate few in the policyholders’ communities—is the maximization of 
profits for their shareholders with little regard for the policyholders’ or 
society’s interests. 
As the insurance industry has become dominated by publicly traded 
 
 229.  One response to the opponents of state sponsored insurance programs who will 
point to the NFIP when explaining why government sponsored insurance programs are a 
bad idea in America is that there are existing examples of successful state sponsored 
insurance programs.  One such example, and this is not to suggest that the program is either 
flawless or above criticism, is Florida’s property insurance program that is administered by 
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.  It offers property insurance to homeowners in 
Florida at premium rates significantly lower than the private market because: (1) it does not 
need to provide an adequate return to investors; (2) it is tax exempt; (3) it does not need to 
raise excessive amounts of capital to pre-fund losses because it has the ability to do post-
loss assessments; and (4) it is reinsured by a state sponsored reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund.  See, e.g., Cole et al., supra note 119, at 267–71 (discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of post loss catastrophe financing).  Despite problems in the 
past and the fact that the State of Florida has been pounded by hurricanes year after year, the 
program continues to successfully provide property insurance to the state’s residents where 
private insurers, both publicly traded stock companies and mutual companies, generally 
have refused to do so or failed. 
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stock companies, the profit imperative has dictated that insurers refuse to 
insure members of society and risks that do not satisfy their profit margin 
goals.  The profit imperative also has forced insurers and their 
policyholders to be adversaries when it comes to paying the policyholders’ 
losses because any amounts paid for losses are amounts that cannot be paid 
to shareholders as profits. 
There is no tenable reason why insurance cannot fulfill its intended 
purpose and role in risk management today as it originally was intended 
when it was first introduced in America.  Three changes to the law could 
accomplish this goal.  One, penalties should be allowed to be imposed on 
insurers that do not pay losses timely and in full to overcome the profit 
imperative’s mandate to pay as little as possible for losses and to delay 
payment as long as possible because there currently is no downside to 
doing so under the existing laws.  Two, for socially critical lines of 
insurance, insurers’ ability to refuse insure people, businesses or risks they 
deem to be inadequately profitable should be reduced or eliminated.  Three, 
if insurers are unwilling to sell insurance subject to these first two changes, 
then state sponsored insurance programs for socially critical lines of 
insurance should be created to fill the void. 
State sponsored insurance programs may actually be a better source 
for socially critical lines of insurance than private insurers.  State sponsored 
insurance programs would not need to spend billions of dollars annually on 
advertising, sales commissions, underwriting, investigating and contesting 
claims; thus, the cost of such insurance should be lower.  State sponsored 
insurance programs also could accumulate capital tax-free to pay 
catastrophic losses without reprisals from shareholders or attacks by 
corporate raiders.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, under state 
sponsored insurance programs the claims adjustment process should not be 
as adversarial because such programs would not be driven by the profit 
imperative which forces insurers to fight with their policyholders regarding 
the payment of losses because each dollar paid for losses is a dollar that 
cannot be paid to shareholders or managers as dividends or bonuses.  Thus, 
instead of fighting with their insurers over money in the wake of 
catastrophes, policyholders could focus their energy on rebuilding and 
moving on with their lives. 
 
